The radicalization of young people is not always manifested through joining extremist movements or openly advocating violence. It can also emerge as a political and moral language in which negotiation is portrayed as defeat, compromise as betrayal, peace as weakness, and the demonstration of force as the ultimate proof of national dignity.
This phenomenon is by no means unique to Armenia. It is one of the manifestations of the growing influence of the radical right, characterized by increasing public demand for strength and for a “strong leader” (in this context, it is hardly coincidental that one of the electoral alliances chose the name “Strong Armenia”), along with pronounced conservatism and patriotism centered on territory, conflict, and dominance.
The 2026 parliamentary elections demonstrated the political potential of this discourse. Although the available post-election data do not allow us to conclude that young voters predominantly supported pro-Russian political forces—since the results are not published simultaneously by both age group and party preference—several pre-election surveys nevertheless present a rather compelling picture that lends support to our hypothesis.
The International Republican Institute’s February pre-election survey found that among respondents aged 18–35, support for the Civil Contract party and the Strong Armenia alliance was nearly identical, at 12% and 10%, respectively. This represented the highest level of support for the opposition among all age groups. Even more revealing was the crisis of political trust: while 40% of the population as a whole reported that they trusted no political leader, the figure rose to 53% among young people. It is also important to note that, although civil society organizations and other stakeholders made extensive and coordinated efforts to encourage youth participation in the elections, the absolute number of young voters was slightly lower than in the 2021 elections. The broader picture, therefore, is not so much one of young people’s vulnerability to pro-Russian influence as one of alienation and profound disillusionment, which create fertile ground both for domestic radical nationalism and for targeted external influence.
The findings of the 2024 Caucasus Barometer likewise challenge the widespread assumption that young people are inherently more pro-European. According to the survey, older generations are more likely to support Armenia’s accession to the European Union, while educated young people in Yerevan are among the most critical of European integration. Moreover, two other authoritative surveys indicate that around half of Armenia’s youth consider democracy to be the best form of government, yet do not identify themselves as “European” and express relatively greater trust in the Church and the armed forces. This points to a highly contradictory configuration of national identity.
These contradictions are ones I have also observed firsthand through years of working with thousands of young people. Two trends have been particularly striking: strong anti-government sentiment and intense criticism of the peace agenda. Deep skepticism toward the prospect of peace has become firmly entrenched among many young people. The causes of both trends are complex and multilayered.
Owing to their age, today’s young generation did not experience the previous semi-authoritarian system as politically conscious citizens. For them, the political freedoms established after the Velvet Revolution are not viewed as a hard-won historical achievement but rather as the natural starting point of political life. They scrutinize government policy closely, judge its shortcomings more harshly, and—often possessing only a
superficial understanding of the pre-revolutionary realities of the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations—tend to attribute full responsibility for the current situation to the incumbent government.
At the same time, the peace process has become almost entirely identified in the public sphere with the current government and has been heavily politicized. Rejection of the government frequently extends to the policy of peace itself. Peace is perceived not as a national or societal strategy, but as the project of a particular political force. Within this environment, militarized patriotism contrasts peace with concepts such as “dignity,” “refusal to compromise,” and struggle.
A second defining characteristic of this generation is that its socialization has taken place entirely in the context of conflict. Its collective memory has been shaped by military escalations, war, border clashes, the deaths of classmates and relatives, blockade, and mass displacement.
For most young Armenians, Azerbaijanis have existed primarily through news reports about the war, hostile content on social media, and as the opposing side in a bloody struggle for survival. The absence of direct contact has prevented perceptions of the other side from being tested through personal interaction and the development of genuine social ties. Armenian-Azerbaijani youth initiatives have been important, but they have remained limited in scope and largely confined to narrow circles. As a result, for a significant share of young people, peace is perceived, at best, as the position of the defeated, and at worst, as a threat.
This does not mean that peace itself is undesirable to them. Survey findings indicate that many young people aspire to lasting peace, yet regard military strength, rather than a peace agreement, as its primary guarantee. Peace is desirable as an outcome, but the path of negotiation inspires little confidence.
Perhaps unexpectedly, militarized masculinity also plays a significant role in shaping these attitudes. Radical right-wing and nationalist ideologies offer a simple and appealing model of social roles: the “real man” is strong, dominant, assertive, defends the homeland, and never retreats. Particularly in patriarchal societies, qualities associated with this model of masculinity are perceived as superior to traits traditionally regarded as feminine: physical force takes precedence over dialogue and diplomacy, while aggression and territorial assertiveness are valued above compromise and peaceful means. In the Armenian context, it is therefore important to recognize that militarized masculinity not only defines what a man is expected to be, but also establishes a hierarchy of political values in which strength acquires moral superiority over peace
Within the same context, global developments are increasingly challenging the widespread assumption that young people are naturally progressive and liberal. In a number of countries, support for right-wing populist and far-right political forces has been growing particularly among young men. According to the results of the 2024 European Parliament elections, more than 21% of young men voted for far-right parties, compared to around 14% of women in the same age group. In the United States, during the most recent elections, 56% of men aged 18–29 supported the right-wing candidate, while a majority of young women voted for the left. Consequently, the trend is better understood not as a uniform conservative shift across an entire generation, but rather as a deepening gender polarization within younger generations, whereby young women increasingly gravitate toward more liberal and progressive positions, while a segment of young men has become more receptive to narratives centered on strength, hierarchy, and anti-feminism.
Although this phenomenon warrants separate and more comprehensive research, it is important in the present context to note that the manosphere may serve as an environment in which everyday notions of toxic masculinity gradually acquire political and nationalist content.
Conclusion
Labeling young people as a “radical generation” is not only inaccurate but also obscures the conditions under which radical ideologies become influential. In Armenia, today’s youth have grown up amid a persistent security crisis, war, loss, and political disillusionment. These experiences do not, in themselves, lead to radicalization. They can, however, weaken confidence in complex, long-term solutions while increasing receptiveness to simple, force-based answers. It is therefore necessary not only to counter such narratives, but also to articulate an alternative language of patriotism—one in which dignity means the capacity to make sovereign decisions, strength signifies responsibility toward statehood and effective democratic institutions, and courage includes restraint, political maturity, and the ability to choose peaceful solutions.
Ideally, the policy of peace should not be associated with any particular political force, but should instead become a publicly debated strategy, open to criticism and broad participation. Without peace education, media literacy, efforts to address the trauma of war, meaningful political representation for young people, and opportunities for safe Armenian-Azerbaijani engagement, it will be difficult to foster a generation for whom peace is understood not as a symbol of defeat, but as a political choice in favor of building a dignified, sovereign, and resilient state.
Eleonora Sargsyan
This article was produced by the Armenian Council Research Center with the support of the Yerevan Office for the South Caucasus of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom.
The views and opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom or its staff.
Sour International Republican Institute – February Public Opinion Survey International Republican Institute – May Public Opinion Survey EVN Report – Youth Electoral Participation Caucasus Barometer – Attitudes toward European Union Membership Center for East European and International Studies – Young People’s Attitudes toward European Union Membership The Gender Gap in Young People’s Support for the Right The U.S. Youth Vote by Gender The Ideological Relationship between Patriarchy and Right-Wing Politics
