In July 2026, Armenia’s Electoral Code was amended to make eligibility to vote in parliamentary elections conditional not only on Armenian citizenship and adulthood, but also on the duration of actual physical presence in the country. Under the new provision, citizens must have spent at least 366 days in Armenia during the two years preceding an election to be eligible to vote, subject to certain statutory exceptions.
At the same time, draft legislation proposing stricter conditions for acquiring citizenship has been circulated. Among other changes, it proposes requiring applicants under the standard naturalisation procedure to have resided lawfully in Armenia for five years and to have been physically present in the country for at least 915 days during that period. Ethnic Armenian applicants would also be required to have been physically present for at least 366 days during the preceding two years.
These initiatives regulate different legal matters, but politically they appear to form part of a broader process. At their core lies a fundamental reconsideration of the relationship between the state and its citizens: making citizenship conditional on a substantive connection to the state, participation in public life, and bearing the consequences of political decisions.
Does Armenia understand itself as a political state for those living within its territory, or also as the homeland of Armenians worldwide, whose connection to it can endure irrespective of physical presence? Posing this question in no way implies that the second approach is preferable to the first. It is important, however, to recognise that what is at issue extends beyond administrative regulations to a possible redefinition of the relationship between the state and its citizens.
International Experience Offers No Ready-Made Answers
Making citizens’ voting rights conditional on residence is not unprecedented in international practice.
In Ireland, citizens must generally reside in the country to vote in parliamentary elections. In Denmark, eligibility to vote in parliamentary elections is likewise tied to permanent residence, although exceptions exist for certain categories of citizens temporarily living abroad.
Germany, Sweden, Italy, France, Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and many other countries, however, take more flexible approaches to the voting rights of their citizens residing abroad. Indeed, in recent years, some countries have moved towards expanding these rights rather than restricting them. Canada, for example, abolished the restriction on voting rights for citizens who had lived abroad for more than five years, while the United Kingdom removed its previous 15-year limit in 2024. Against this background, Armenia’s chosen regulation is comparatively stringent.
However, the existence of a practice in another democratic system does not in itself make it justified. Nor is the stringency of a regulation sufficient, on its own, to characterise it as undemocratic. What matters is its purpose, proportionality, the circumstances of its adoption, and its potential long-term consequences.
In this regard, the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters is particularly relevant. It states that a minimum residence requirement may be imposed on citizens only for local or regional elections. Although not legally binding, it is an important expert benchmark for assessing democratic electoral systems.
Considerations and Risks
- A disproportionate response. The political context in which the law was adopted is understandable. Ahead of the 2026 parliamentary elections, reports circulated about organised travel to Armenia by Armenian citizens from Russia and possible external influence over their voting. The risk of such interference cannot be ignored.
Yet the actual figures also merit attention. According to information obtained by Infocom from the National Security Service, 33,168 people entered Armenia from Russia using Armenian passports between 1 May and 7 June, compared with 29,810 during the same period the previous year—an increase of just 3,358. Admittedly, some arrivals using Russian passports may also have held Armenian citizenship, which raises the question of stricter regulation of dual citizenship. The number of arrivals could also, in theory, have been higher had appropriate preventive measures not been taken.
If the problem is vote-buying, coercion, or organised unlawful foreign influence, the primary remedies should be sought in stronger counterintelligence capabilities, tighter oversight of political financing, and more effective law enforcement. Where specific individuals’ actions constitute a criminal offence, the relevant criminal law mechanisms should apply. Restricting the voting rights of a broad group of citizens in response to potentially unlawful conduct by particular individuals, however, raises serious questions of proportionality.
- A narrow criterion. The law makes voting rights conditional on actual physical presence in Armenia for at least 366 days over a two-year period. For example, someone born in Armenia who has lived there for 28 years may travel abroad for a year to work or travel and, by failing to meet the statutory threshold, lose the right to vote in the next election. Yet they may return to Armenia immediately after the election and live under the decisions of the newly elected government.
A frequent argument in favour of a residence requirement is that those who will bear the consequences of a government’s decisions should be the ones to elect it. This reasoning is understandable. However, the law assesses the connection between citizen and state through past physical presence, whereas the consequences of political decisions also extend into the future.
This criterion also merits consideration in the context of an increasingly mobile and globalised world, where remote work, digital nomadism, and lifestyles involving alternating periods of residence in several countries are becoming more common. Physical presence no longer necessarily reflects a person’s social, economic, or political ties to a state. It is partly in response to these changing realities that some democracies are reviewing and removing longstanding restrictions on the voting rights of citizens living abroad.
- Potential manipulation of the electorate and the risk of entrenching those in power. Perhaps the most troubling aspect of this regulation is its dependence on the political context. Today, it may serve to protect democratic elections from external interference, yet acquire an entirely different function following a change of government.
Imagine that authoritarian, corrupt, or externally controlled forces come to power in Armenia. Civil society, independent journalists, activists, and political opponents face repression, forcing some of them to leave the country. By the next election, many of these individuals no longer meet the residence requirement. Thus, by directly or indirectly driving certain groups to emigrate, the government can also influence the composition of the electorate in subsequent elections.
Such an outcome does not require the law to have been adopted with that intention. This is precisely the danger of politically expedient regulations: a measure that appears useful under today’s circumstances may tomorrow become an instrument for perpetuating authoritarian rule.
- A one-sided understanding of the political role of citizens living abroad. It is important to recognise that Armenian citizens living abroad are not politically homogeneous, and that the nature of their influence can also change depending on the political context. In other words, their participation will not always be externally directed or a cause for concern for democracy. In some circumstances, it may have precisely the opposite effect, serving as a counterweight to external interference or authoritarian tendencies. Moldova’s electoral experience offers an interesting example: diaspora participation has played an important role in supporting pro-European political forces there.
- The provision of exceptions. It is positive that the legislature has sought to provide exceptions, particularly for those pursuing higher education abroad, public servants posted abroad on official duties, and family members of diplomatic personnel. Notably, there is no general exception for absence from the country on health grounds.
The issue, of course, is not merely whether the list of exceptions is comprehensive. Exceptions tied to specific circumstances create scope for differential treatment and arbitrariness in their documentation and application, as well as for subsequent changes to their scope based on political expediency. The exercise of political rights should not gradually become dependent on whether the state considers a citizen’s reasons for being absent acceptable.
Conclusion
In this context, the haste with which the amendment was adopted also merits examination in light of a possible referendum on a new constitution and the prospect of snap parliamentary elections, which has recently become a subject of discussion.
There are, of course, no grounds to assert that the new restriction on voting rights was adopted specifically with these political processes in mind. Nevertheless, the rapid adoption of a change that directly affects the composition of the electorate, and its potential application in forthcoming electoral processes, raise further questions about the regulation’s political expediency and long-term justification.
Ultimately, it is understandable why some consider this law reasonable under the current political circumstances. Yet it is important to remember that democratic institutions should not be designed solely around the government of the day, current threats, and considerations of political expediency. The law must also be assessed in terms of how it would operate in the hands of a government we do not trust, and under political conditions in which we ourselves would not wish to live.
Eleonora Sargsyan
Sources:
- Constitutional Law Amending the Electoral Code of the Republic of Armenia (3 July 2026)
- Draft Amendments to the Law on Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia (2026)
- Infocom — Investigation into Armenian Citizens Arriving from Russia
- Voting Rights in Ireland
- Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters
- Comparative Analysis of Diaspora Participation and Voting Results in Moldova’s Elections, 2014–2025
This article was produced by the Armenian Council Research Center with the support of the Yerevan Office of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom’s South Caucasus regional programme.
The opinions and positions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom or its staff.
