The “post-conflict vocabulary” that emerges after any protracted conflict is rarely neutral. It becomes a field of political contestation in its own right, where the choice and use of terms shape perceptions—sometimes more effectively than the facts themselves. In Armenian–Azerbaijani relations, one of the most frequently used terms is “revanchism.” In recent years, Baku’s official rhetoric has turned it into an almost universal response to any legal, cultural, or diplomatic position articulated by the Armenian side, regardless of whether the speaker is a government representative, an opposition figure, an expert, or a member of the clergy. This analysis seeks to distinguish the term’s substantive scholarly meaning from the political function it serves, drawing on its historical context, conceptual foundations, and specific episodes from recent years.
The term’s origins and scholarly meaning. In international relations, “revanchism” acquired its classic usage in the context of Franco-German relations in the late nineteenth century, describing France’s aspiration to recover Alsace-Lorraine by military means following its loss in the war of 1871. Under the classical definition, revanchism requires the simultaneous presence of three elements: a clearly articulated objective of recovering lost territory or status, material preparations to that end, and an active state-level programme to achieve that objective. Without the combination of all three elements, the term loses its analytical precision.
It is essential to distinguish revanchism from related but fundamentally different phenomena: the preservation of historical memory (the study, documentation, and public discussion of historical facts), the defence of a legal position (upholding one’s constitutional provisions or positions under international law), and the affirmation of identity (defending a scholarly position on the cultural attribution of heritage). None of these three categories, in itself, meets the criteria of the scholarly definition of “revanchism,” since none necessarily entails an intention to use force.
The term’s evolution over the course of the conflict. The discourse surrounding “revanchism” has changed considerably throughout the history of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. During the 1988–1994 phase, when the conflict still involved active warfare, both sides’ use of the term was relatively consistent with its classical meaning: territorial objectives and military means were indeed present. Between 1994 and 2020, the term’s applicability became asymmetrical. Baku presented its position as the restoration of its internationally recognised territorial integrity, while the Armenian side’s conception of self-determination rested on different legal grounds. Following the 44-day war and, particularly, the military operation of September 2023, when Azerbaijan established full control over the entire territory of Artsakh, the situation changed qualitatively. Baku now held territorial control, yet continued to invoke concerns about “revanchism” as a pre-emptive rhetorical category with almost undiminished intensity, despite the fundamental shift in the balance of power. This historical contradiction is itself analytically significant: the intensity with which the term is used reflects not only the level of objective threat but also considerations of domestic and foreign policy expediency.
Patterns of usage in 2024–2026. The issue of the preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia offers the clearest example of the conflation of concepts. Azerbaijan has stated that the peace agreement initialled in August 2025 will not be signed as long as the preamble to Armenia’s Constitution retains its reference to the 1990 Declaration of Independence. Armenia’s Constitutional Court had already ruled in 2024 that this reference has legal effect only in relation to provisions expressly enshrined in the articles of the Constitution and cannot be interpreted as a territorial claim. Also noteworthy is Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s counterargument that the preamble to Azerbaijan’s own Constitution refers to the 1918 declaration, which encompassed a territory substantially larger than that of present-day Azerbaijan. This lack of symmetry—where the same structural feature of a legal text is treated as a threat in one case but not in the other—reveals a selective approach to the use of the term.
The dispute over cultural heritage perhaps most clearly illustrates how this mechanism also operates in the opposite direction. On 13–14 September, Hikmet Hajiyev, an assistant to the President of Azerbaijan, accompanied diplomats accredited to Azerbaijan and representatives of international organisations to the Gandzasar and Dadivank monastic complexes. He declared them to be “Caucasian Albanian” heritage and displayed copies of Armenian manuscripts, thereby attempting to sow confusion among the ambassadors about the existence and continuity of Armenian identity in Artsakh. Although the Armenian institutional response was documentary in nature and devoid of aggressive rhetoric, Baku quickly framed it within the discourse of “revanchism.” Two days later, Aliyev countered by declaring that the Armenian side had destroyed 65 mosques in territories formerly under its control. This chain of mutual accusations demonstrates that the issue of historical damage is being used as an immediate political counterattack, rather than treated as a matter for independent investigation.
The recurring formulation “revanchist dreams,” which Hajiyev regularly directs at the Armenian political elite, has a distinctive structural feature: it is never accompanied by specific, verifiable evidence. Instead, it functions as a demand premised on an assumption, requiring the Armenian side to renounce something whose very existence has not been established. Used in this way, the term reverses the burden of proof. Rather than demonstrating that Armenia is preparing for any military action, it is enough to assert that the Armenian side “has not yet fully abandoned” such intentions—a claim that is virtually impossible to disprove.
Why this mechanism works. The persistent use of the term can be explained by at least three functions it serves. First, it supports domestic legitimation and mobilisation by signalling a commitment to protecting gains against potential threats. Second, it serves as a negotiating lever, pre-emptively neutralising any Armenian legal or diplomatic position by labelling it a “hidden threat.” Third, before an international audience, it reinforces Azerbaijan’s image as a party whose caution is supposedly justified by experience, making it easier to secure support from mediators.
Nevertheless, this effectiveness can prove self-defeating over the long term. According to the classical model of the security dilemma, when every defensive or identity-affirming action by one side is systematically interpreted as evidence of offensive intent, a dynamic of escalation emerges, narrowing the space for meaningful dialogue. Moreover, the repeated and exaggerated use of the term gradually undermines its credibility among international observers. This may weaken Baku’s own position in situations where a genuinely verifiable security concern does arise.
Conclusions. Three fundamental distinctions emerge from this analysis. Maintaining them is a necessary condition for stabilising the post-conflict situation.
First, borders and governments are political and therefore subject to change over time and as circumstances evolve, as history demonstrates. By contrast, the architecture and inscriptions of a monument of exceptional historical value constitute documentary evidence that is not open to negotiation and cannot be rewritten by any present-day political agreement.
Second, disagreement is not synonymous with the absence of peace. The parties can retain substantial differences over legal, historical, and cultural issues while advancing practical, economic, and security cooperation. Comparable international experiences demonstrate that tensions at the symbolic level can coexist with technical progress over extended periods without directly undermining it.
Third, one party’s criticism of the other’s position does not constitute a territorial claim. To characterise a legal reference whose scope has been explicitly limited by a Constitutional Court ruling as a “territorial claim,” or to interpret an objection grounded in scholarship and documentary evidence as “revanchism,” is to conflate distinct categories in a way that serves to exert negotiating pressure.
Achieving stable and lasting peace requires both sides to consciously maintain these distinctions, preventing disagreements at the level of symbolism and discourse from being recast as security threats. Otherwise, the very rhetorical strategy intended to ensure long-term stability may become a source of its erosion.
This article was produced by the Armenian Council Research Center with the support of the Yerevan Office of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom’s South Caucasus regional programme.
The opinions and positions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom or its staff.
References
• Pashinyan Addresses Azerbaijan’s Precondition for Amendments to Armenia’s Constitution
• Unlike Armenia’s Constitution, Azerbaijan’s Contains Territorial Claims Against Armenia: Pashinyan
• Baku Sees Constitutional Referendum in Armenia
• Visit by Diplomatic Corps Representatives to Karabakh and East Zangezur Concludes
• Jervis, Robert. “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics.
• Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. (1977/2012). Power and Interdependence.Longman.
