The US Midterm Elections and Armenia

by Armenian Council

The US midterm elections held on 3 November marked a major political defeat for Donald Trump and the Republican Party. The Democrats secured control of both chambers of Congress: the Senate and the House of Representatives. From January 2027, Washington will therefore have a divided government: the White House will remain in Republican hands, while both chambers of the legislature will come under Democratic control.

A New Balance of Power in Congress

According to preliminary results, the Democrats have already secured 254 seats in the House of Representatives, compared with 164 for the Republicans. In the Senate, the Democrats and the independent senators who caucus with them together hold 54 seats, while the Republicans have 44, with two seats still undecided. The Democrats are thus not only regaining control of both chambers but also substantially shifting the balance of power in Congress.

The election results send a strong signal of public dissatisfaction with the Trump administration. Their political significance, however, must also be assessed in light of another consideration: Donald Trump has two years left in office. Losing control of Congress will constrain his domestic agenda, but it does not mean that the president will lose his principal means of influencing foreign policy.

Control of both chambers of Congress carries considerable weight in the US political system. The Democrats will be able to chair congressional committees, launch investigations into the administration’s activities, hold hearings, oversee the budget process and influence funding decisions related to foreign policy. Control of the Senate will also give them additional influence over the confirmation of ambassadors, senior administration officials and judges.

Nevertheless, the US president remains a central decision-maker in foreign policy. He holds broad executive powers, represents the country in international affairs and can continue to pursue his foreign policy initiatives even when the opposition holds a majority in Congress.

Trump also retains the power to veto legislation. The Democrats cannot simply reverse the president’s policy decisions or use legislation to compel him to adopt their agenda. Overriding a presidential veto requires a two-thirds majority in each chamber of Congress. Over the next two years, therefore, a further intensification of political conflict between the White House and Congress is more likely than a wholesale reversal of US foreign policy.

Under these circumstances, the Democrats may increase pressure on the Trump administration over Ukraine, Iran, China and the Middle East, seeking to constrain or revise some of the president’s initiatives. At the same time, congressional control over funding and legislation will allow them to play a more active role in shaping the foreign policy agenda.

It should be emphasised that midterm election results do not automatically determine the outcome of presidential elections. American history itself demonstrates this. In 1994, during Bill Clinton’s presidency, the Republicans won a major congressional victory, gaining control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Yet two years later, in 1996, Clinton was re-elected president, defeating Republican Bob Dole.

A similar pattern emerged in 2010. In the first midterm elections of Barack Obama’s presidency, the Republicans gained 63 seats in the House of Representatives, achieving one of their largest electoral victories in decades. Nevertheless, Obama won re-election in 2012, defeating Mitt Romney.

These examples show that success or defeat in the midterms does not predetermine the outcome of the next presidential election. The Democrats’ victory does not guarantee their return to the White House in 2028, just as the Republicans’ defeat does not mean an end to Trump’s political influence.

Rather, following the midterms, the US political system will gradually shift towards preparations for the 2028 presidential election. For the Democrats, the task will be not only to retain their advantage in Congress but also to nominate a candidate capable of winning the presidency. Within the Republican Party, the question of political leadership after Trump will inevitably become more pressing. The midterms thus mark the first major milestone in the next presidential contest.

Armenia–US Relations and Their Prospects

Developing relations with the United States has become an important priority of Armenia’s foreign policy in recent years. Bilateral ties, previously centred primarily on political dialogue, democratic reforms and economic cooperation, have gradually expanded to encompass security, defence, economic, energy, technological and regional issues.

It is important to emphasise that the deepening of relations is not solely a policy initiative of the Trump administration. Its foundations were laid under the Democrats. In June 2024, the two sides agreed to upgrade their bilateral relationship, and on 14 January 2025, in the final days of Joe Biden’s administration, they signed the Strategic Partnership Charter[i]. The Trump administration, in turn, gave this process a new geopolitical and economic dimension, linking it to establishing peace in the South Caucasus, reopening transport links and expanding the US economic presence in the region.

A key milestone in this policy was the Washington summit of 8 August 2025[ii]. Alongside the agreements reached between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Armenia and the United States signed three memoranda covering capacity-building for the Crossroads of Peace project, cooperation on artificial intelligence and semiconductors, and energy security. These reflected Washington’s interest in extending cooperation with Armenia beyond politics into the economic, technological and infrastructure sectors[iii].

This US approach should be viewed in the context of its broader strategic interests in the South Caucasus. The region’s significance stems from the prospects for developing economic and energy links between Central Asia and Europe, as well as tapping the Caspian Sea’s resources and the region’s connectivity potential. Deepening relations with Armenia therefore allows Washington to strengthen its strategic position in the region, while enabling Yerevan to expand its role in emerging economic and transport networks.

The TRIPP project has become an important means of advancing these interests. It envisages not only the development of transport links but also the expansion of regional infrastructure and the creation of new economic opportunities. For Armenia, it could help realise the country’s transit potential, attract investment and expand access to international markets.

The TRIPP Strategic Cooperation Framework Agreement, initialled on 26 May 2026 and signed on 4 June, marked an important step towards implementing the project. The agreement’s ratification and the launch, on 7 November, of trilateral technical planning groups involving Armenia, the United States and Azerbaijan in the areas of transport and electricity transmission indicate that the project is gradually entering the implementation phase[iv].

The principal milestone in elevating bilateral relations to a new level was the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Charter signed on 26 May 2026 by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan[v]. It is more than an updated version of the previous document: it provides a broader political and institutional framework for cooperation. While the January 2025 charter laid the foundations for a strategic partnership, the new document elevated relations to a more advanced level of cooperation across multiple sectors, encompassing defence, security, energy, strategic raw materials, high technology, the economy and education.

A separate document on supply chains for critical minerals and rare metals was also signed during the visit on 26 May[vi]. This provides further evidence that Armenian–American cooperation is gradually moving beyond political agreements towards concrete economic, technological and infrastructure projects.

Developments in 2025–2026 thus show that Armenian–American relations have expanded not only in scope but also in institutional depth. The initial framework for the strategic partnership has been supplemented by new sectoral agreements, while the comprehensive charter has established a broader framework for their implementation. The long-term significance of these developments will depend on the extent to which the signed documents translate into sustained, mutually beneficial cooperation.

The Democrats’ victory in both chambers of Congress may create new opportunities as well as some uncertainty for Armenia. On the one hand, the Democratic majority may devote greater attention to democracy, human rights, regional security and Armenia’s sovereignty. Congressional discussions on the South Caucasus may also intensify, including on the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, border security and regional transport links.

On the other hand, disagreements between the Democrats and the Trump administration could complicate funding for certain initiatives or the passage of legislation needed to support them. Projects requiring additional congressional funding or legislative changes, in particular, may become the subject of political negotiations.

The prospects for implementing TRIPP warrant particular attention in this context. Although progress on the project currently depends to a considerable extent on the Trump administration’s political will, support for its regional role has also been expressed in Democratic circles. The shift in the balance of power in Congress is therefore not, in itself, grounds for assuming that the project’s implementation will be adversely affected. At the same time, congressional oversight may prompt further discussions about funding, institutional arrangements and implementation mechanisms. For Armenia, it is important that TRIPP continue to be viewed as a project serving long-term US regional interests, rather than solely as one administration’s political initiative.

Preserving the bipartisan political foundations of Armenian–American relations is crucial for Armenia. The strategic partnership framework established under the Democrats and the new agreements advanced under the Republicans complement one another. Armenia’s task should therefore be to maintain and strengthen support from both major parties, rather than align itself with either side in US domestic political competition.

At the same time, the impact of political changes in Washington should not be overstated. The effectiveness of Armenia’s relations with the United States will also depend on the consistency of its own foreign policy, the implementation of existing agreements and its willingness to take the initiative in regional affairs. In other words, Armenia can make effective use of the opportunities within the US political environment only if it sets clear priorities and consistently advances its interests.

Conclusion

The political race towards the 2028 US presidential election has begun. Trump still has two years to advance his foreign policy agenda, while the Democrats have the same period to turn their congressional victory into political capital. Under these circumstances, Armenia should use the opportunity to develop relations with both major US political parties and strengthen the institutional mechanisms already in place.

For Armenia, the central question is not who won the US midterm elections, but how to ensure that bipartisan support in Washington translates into a consistent, long-term policy.

Narek Minasyan

This article was produced by the Armenian Council Research Center with the support of the Yerevan Office of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom’s South Caucasus region.

The opinions and positions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom or its staff.


[i] https://www.mfa.am/hy/press-releases/2025/01/14/ARM-US-Charter/13032?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[ii] https://www.primeminister.am/hy/press-release/item/2025/08/09/Nikol-Pashinyan-visit-US-declaration/

[iii] https://www.primeminister.am/hy/press-release/item/2025/08/09/Nikol-Pashinyan-US-meeting-Trump/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[iv] https://www.mfa.am/hy/press-releases/2026/11/07/Trilateral/14257

[v] https://www.mfa.am/hy/press-releases/2026/05/26/Armenia_USA/13973?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[vi] https://www.mfa.am/hy/press-releases/2026/05/26/Critical_minerals/13972?utm_source=chatgpt.com

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