Introduction
This paper summarizes accumulated knowledge presented across various articles on the party system and party financing, the electoral system, and certain electoral processes. Based on this foundation, forecasts are made regarding the 2026 parliamentary elections.
These forecasts are intended to be ongoing and presented as a series. Subsequent forecasts will be published three months prior to the scheduled parliamentary elections in June and again in the period immediately preceding the elections. In this sense, the forecasts presented will be assessed and revised in light of the information available in the relevant forthcoming works. This approach will make it possible to trace political and legal developments by evaluating both changes and the absence thereof.
Forecasts
Voter turnout will be higher (in percentage terms) than in the previous two parliamentary elections
When assessing expected voter turnout in the upcoming parliamentary elections, several factors should be taken into account. First, it is necessary to review turnout figures from the previous two parliamentary elections. These elections serve as a reference point not only because they are the most recent and thus comparable, but also because, given their quality and legitimacy, the data can be considered reliable.
The table below presents absolute and percentage turnout figures for the 2018 and 2021 parliamentary elections:
| Election Year | Number of Voters Participating | Number of Registered Voters | Turnout (%) |
| 2018 | 1,261,105 | 2,593,140 | 48.6 |
| 2021 | 1,281,997 | 2,595,512 | 49.3 |
At first glance, it is noteworthy that turnout in 2021 was higher than in 2018. This may appear counterintuitive, given the heightened public enthusiasm, political interest, and engagement surrounding the 2018 elections. It is also evident that the absolute number of registered voters remained almost unchanged over the three-year period, while participation increased by only about 20,000 voters.
The main argument for why turnout in the 2026 parliamentary elections will be higher in percentage terms than in previous elections lies in legislative changes that have led to more precise approaches to aligning voter lists with reality. Consequently, it can be expected that the absolute number of registered voters will not change significantly in 2026 either. Combined with the level of engagement by political forces and the intensity of the election campaign, participation in absolute terms is likely to remain similar. As a result, the turnout percentage is expected to increase.
Fewer electoral alliances among participating forces
In the 2021 parliamentary elections, 26 political forces participated—the highest number in recent history—largely due to uncertainty surrounding the election outcome and political instability, which also encouraged political adventurism. In general, an open and inclusive political environment and competition are positive developments; however, under these conditions, a significant number of participants failed to secure even 1% of the vote. Of the 26 forces, only four competed as alliances (15%).
In 2018, 11 forces participated, two of which ran as alliances (18%). In the upcoming elections, the electoral thresholds have been revised: the threshold for parties has been reduced from 5% to 4%, while the threshold for alliances has been raised—8% for alliances of two or three parties and 10% for alliances of four or more parties.
Even prior to these changes, the threshold for alliances was relatively high, which limited their number. As a result of the new regulations, the proportion of alliances among participants is unlikely to increase. Moreover, many participants are expected to be de facto alliances that formally compete under a single party list. As for the total number of participants, given the competitive and inclusive nature of the political field, the uncertainty of outcomes, and the lower threshold for parties, participation is expected to exceed the 11 forces of 2018 and approach the 26 seen in 2021.
More political forces will enter parliament
Taking into account the competitiveness and inclusiveness of the political field, the uncertainty of outcomes, the lower threshold for parties, and the anticipated diversity of competitors,it can be argued that more forces will enter parliament than in 2021. This forecast is relatively straightforward, as under the existing framework only the minimum of three forces were represented in the previous parliament. Notably, the I Have Honor («Պատիվ ունեմ») alliance failed to pass the electoral threshold yet still entered parliament by virtue of provisions in the existing legal framework.
To refine this forecast, it should be emphasized that the next parliament will be more fragmented and inclusive, with a higher effective number of parties. The concept of the effective number of parties and how it has changed in response to reforms in Armenia’s electoral system has been examined in detail elsewhere.
There will be no second round of elections
Despite the forecast of a more fragmented parliament with a larger number of represented forces following the 2026 elections, it is unlikely that a second round of elections will take place. Given the current alignment of political forces and the range of potential coalitions, a second round is not expected. This forecast will be particularly interesting to revisit in subsequent installments of the series, especially in light of possible shifts in the balance of power.
The political force led by Gagik Tsarukyan will enter parliament
While both new and established political forces are attempting to claim the role of a “third force,” and undecided voters are seeking a viable alternative, Gagik Tsarukyan stands out in this context. All indications suggest that the force led by Tsarukyan—conventionally referred to as Prosperous Armenia («Բարգավաճ Հայաստան»)—will participate in the upcoming elections.
Given Tsarukyan’s resources, public perception, and, importantly, his neutral stance on a number of political issues (such as church–state relations and regional processes), his political force is well positioned to naturally occupy the space of a third force. Moreover, depending on the election results, it is not unlikely that Tsarukyan’s position will have a significant impact on the formation of the government.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it should be reiterated that these forecasts do not aim to provide a definitive or exhaustive representation of reality. Rather, their primary purpose is analytical and exploratory, offering a framework for understanding political developments and trends through data-driven analysis.
Tigran Mughnetsyan
