Amid Armenia’s heated election campaign, at a time when public attention was firmly focused on political developments, several videos circulated on social media that represented classic examples of the dangers posed by hybrid warfare.
Before turning to the most prominent examples, it is worth examining a video in which Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev allegedly addresses the Armenian public, urging citizens to participate in the elections and vote for Nikol Pashinyan, portraying him as a “guarantor of peace.”i The video also includes what appear to be explicit threats related to the false “Western Azerbaijan” narrative, the forum held in Nakhchivan, and Azerbaijanis allegedly “returning” to Armenia by car, as well as a veiled demand for amendments to Armenia’s Constitution.
The objective of the video was clear: to exploit some of the most sensitive issues in Armenian public discourse in order to mislead voters, create a false agenda, and sow confusion within society. In reality, however, the situation is far simpler. Both the Azerbaijani-language audio and the Armenian translation featured in the video were fabricated and bear no relation to the actual content of the Azerbaijani president’s remarks.
The Facts
The original video dates back to March 5, 2026. On that day, Ilham Aliyev addressed a meeting of the Security Council, where he spokeii about an incident involving a drone launched by Iran toward Nakhchivan Airport. In the original speech, there was no mention whatsoever of Nikol Pashinyan, Armenia’s elections, or the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia. The authentic footage was paired with a fabricated audio track using classic deepfake technology.
This operation was a textbook example of hybrid warfare aimed at disrupting democratic processes. Its objective was to foster a crisis of trust, generate panic, and deepen polarization within Armenian society.
Another example of the exploitation of public concerns in the media space was the claim circulated on social media that “Azerbaijanis have already been brought to Armenia.” This case demonstrates how an ordinary work-related reality can be transformed into a politically charged topic of discussion.
The original source of this information flow was public figure Nairi Hokhikyaniii, who was among the first to share the relevant video, framing it with a particular interpretation. Subsequently, a number of media outletsiv and social media pages, relying on that publication, began sounding the alarm that Azerbaijanis had been brought to Syunik. However, subsequent fact-checking revealed that the individuals shown in the video were, in fact, Iranian citizens.
It is well known that numerous Iranian workers are involved in various construction and infrastructure projects currently underway in Syunik. Since some of these workers come from northern regions of Iran, where Turkic languages are widely spoken, and communicate in one of the Azerbaijani language varieties, this appears to have served as the basis for the aforementioned perception.
As a result, a routine work process taking place in Syunik—one that had no connection whatsoever to electoral or political issues—was artificially reframed through the lens of sensationalized narratives and transformed into a subject of domestic political speculation.
Notably, the same TikTok account that published the manipulated video featuring the fabricated speech attributed to Aliyev also shared this video.
The development of digital technologies has provided new tools for those engaged in media manipulation, leading to the increasing use of internationally recognized public figures as instruments for influencing domestic political discourse. A striking example was a videov that appeared online in which American actress Melora Hardin—best known for her role in the television series The Office—allegedly addresses her Armenian fans.
In the video, an AI-generated voice, presented as that of the actress, claims that the outcome of Armenia’s elections will determine “whether a new war begins or not.” The clip features a series of sharp political statements, while Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is compared to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, with the assertion that he is “doing everything possible to provoke a war with Russia because his European sponsors have already paid for it.” Toward the end of the video, the actress purportedly calls on Armenian voters to prevent Pashinyan’s victory, arguing that doing so could “save hundreds of thousands of lives.”
In reality, as was later revealed by international research organizations, the video was part of a coordinated disinformation campaign carried out by networks such as “Storm-1516” and “Matryoshka.” Using the Cameo platform—which allows users to purchase personalized video messages from public figures—the organizers commissioned the actress to record a video based on an entirely different script. They subsequently employed technological tools to completely alter the audio and underlying message, overlaying the footage with scenes related to Armenia’s domestic political life and inserting politically biased commentary.
This case provides another clear illustration of how information operations linked to external actors seek to exploit the image and credibility of well-known personalities in order to exert artificial influence over electoral processes.
How Not to Get Lost in the Information Space: A Few Simple Steps for Verifying Facts
The public often lacks the resources to verify information quickly, making it easy to fall victim to such manipulative campaigns. The best defense is a healthy degree of skepticism toward any piece of information. Today, information flows are so rapid and dense that virtually any manipulation can become the subject of public debate within a matter of hours. To avoid falling prey to misunderstandings or coordinated disinformation campaigns, several accessible verification methods can be employed:
• Reverse Image Search
If the people, location, or statements featured in a video appear suspicious, a simple first step is to take a screenshot from the video and upload it to a search engine. This can help determine when the image first appeared online and identify the event or context to which it actually relates.
• Video Analysis
One of the most widely used tools among journalists and fact-checkers is the InVID browser extensionvi. It allows users to break down a video into individual frames, examine metadata, and assess whether the material has been manipulated or edited.
• Detecting Deepfakes
Videos generated or altered using artificial intelligence—as in the cases involving the President of Azerbaijan or the foreign actress discussed above—almost always leave visible traces. Careful attention should be paid to the synchronization between lip movements and spoken words, blinking patterns, and facial shadows. In addition, synthesized voices often lack the natural pauses associated with human breathing and the subtle emotional variations characteristic of genuine speech.
• Verifying the Original Source
When a video is presented as having been published by a well-known international media outlet, the first step should be to check that outlet’s official website or social media channels. If no such material appears there, it is likely to be fabricated. In such cases, it is also useful to consult local and international fact-checking platforms—such as Fip.am, FactCheck, and Snopes—which often respond quickly to widely discussed or controversial claims.
Information security is a shared responsibility, particularly at times when a country stands on the threshold of important decisions.
i https://www.tiktok.com/@armenin777000/video/7648234793519353108?_r=1&_t=ZS-972AQZgaQjP\ ii https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O87s0wJD76I&t=5s iii https://www.facebook.com/reel/2572982869816232 iv https://www.facebook.com/reel/2572982869816232 v https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2822009581484080 vi https://www.invid-project.eu/ Vii https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/05/20/pro-kremlin-actors-launch-large-scale-disinformation-campaign-targeting-armenias-elections Viii https://euvsdisinfo.eu/ Diana Karapetyan This article was produced by the Armenian Council Research Center with the support of the Yerevan Office of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom for the South Caucasus. The views and opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom or its staff.
