On June 14, the Central Electoral Commission announced the final results of the parliamentary elections. According to the official results, three political forces will enter the National Assembly. The Civil Contract party will form the government and secure a constitutional majority, while the Strong Armenia alliance and the Armenia Alliance will serve as the parliamentary opposition. The Prosperous Armenia Party failed to clear the electoral threshold by only a few dozen votes.
Notably, the CEC decided not to hold a repeat vote in the three polling stations where the election results had been annulled. Had those votes been counted, Prosperous Armenia might have crossed the threshold and entered parliament. Regardless of one’s legal or political assessment of this decision, the pro-Russian opposition now faces three possible courses of action.
1. Accept the election results
Under this scenario, the elected representatives of the Armenia Alliance and Strong Armenia would take their seats in parliament and seek to halt—or at least slow down—the decline of Russian influence in Armenia and the country’s efforts to diversify its foreign policy. Prosperous Armenia would accept its failure to enter parliament and remain outside the National Assembly.
This would effectively mean that not only these political forces, but also the Kremlin, acknowledge their defeat and accept the legitimacy of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government.
2. Reject the results and launch a street protest movement
This appears to be the least likely scenario. Pro-Russian political forces are well aware that they lack the critical mass of support needed to sustain a successful protest movement. Moreover, all previous attempts to challenge the authorities through street mobilization with limited resources have ended unsuccessfully.
3. Reject the Election Results and Appeal to the Constitutional Court to Have Them Annulled
Under this option, the opposition would seek to have the election results declared invalid by the Constitutional Court. There is at least some possibility of success, and theoretically this could lead to new elections.
However, such a course would create several problems that are unlikely to be appealing to either the pro-Russian forces or the Kremlin.
First, they would have to recognize the legitimacy of the Constitutional Court regardless of the outcome of the proceedings. Second, if the elections were annulled and new elections called, pro-Russian actors could lose the gains they have already secured after investing substantial resources in the campaign. It would be difficult to once again mobilize tens of thousands of Armenian citizens residing in Russia to travel to Armenia or to deploy financial resources on a similar scale.
Another challenge concerns the criminal proceedings involving opposition leaders. Samvel Karapetyan, Narek Karapetyan, Robert Kocharyan, and Gagik Tsarukyan are already subject to restrictions on leaving Armenia and face various criminal allegations. In the event of new elections, either their public political activity or even their personal liberty could be further restricted, significantly limiting their ability to participate in the campaign.
In essence, none of the three options is particularly attractive. The Kremlin faces a difficult choice, and the political forces advancing its interests in Armenia are unlikely to make such a decision independently. Most likely, they will wait for guidance from Moscow. Yet whichever path is chosen, it is likely to come at a political cost.
