Many democratic countries—or those undergoing democratic transition—are today exposed to hybrid attacks, often attributed to authoritarian states. These attacks typically target state institutions, governments, national leadership, as well as organizations and individuals engaged in promoting democracy. In response, a number of states and international organizations have developed strategies and established specialized bodies to counter hybrid threats more effectively. However, efforts at the state level alone are not sufficient to address these challenges. In this context, civil society organizations (CSOs) play a crucial role, particularly those working in the fields of democracy promotion and human rights protection.
Each set of institutions has its own strengths. State bodies possess a far broader range of tools. At the same time, civil society organizations often maintain closer ties with different segments of society and their direct constituencies, which gives them a clear advantage. While state institutions have access to coercive tools and, through various agencies, can identify and neutralize elements of hybrid threats—for example, by uncovering and disrupting illicit financial flows, countering unlawful foreign interference in electoral processes, or exposing the activities of foreign provocateurs—civil society organizations are better suited to fact-checking, media monitoring, investigative journalism (including undercover reporting), and running media literacy initiatives.
Today, Armenia is among the primary targets of hybrid attacks. In particular, nearly all Russian-linked disinformation networks that in recent years were especially active in Ukraine and Moldova have, since mid-2025, launched large-scale and unprecedented campaigns against Armenia. The intensification of these efforts is clearly linked to the parliamentary elections scheduled for June. In other words, these campaigns also pursue a concrete short-term objective: to influence the election results and disrupt the electoral process.
I have personally addressed these attacks and the narratives they promote in several articles, and have also provided analysis through various media platforms. The existence of hybrid threats targeting Armenia is explicitly acknowledged in the annual report of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Armenia. It is also worth noting that Armenia has sought assistance from the European Union to strengthen its resilience against such threats.
It is important that a number of Armenian civil society organizations—largely with the support of Western donors—are already implementing a range of initiatives aimed at countering hybrid attacks. While it remains difficult to assess their overall effectiveness, and it is still too early for definitive evaluations, there are visible signs of progress, at least in the social media space. Fact-
checking platforms, in particular, have been especially active. Another positive development is the emergence of cooperation frameworks both within Armenia and between Armenian and international civil society organizations, which represents a meaningful achievement.
It is important that a number of Armenian civil society organizations—largely supported by Western donors—are already implementing a range of initiatives aimed at countering hybrid threats. While it remains difficult to assess their effectiveness, and it is still too early for comprehensive evaluation, there are nevertheless visible results, at least in the social media space. Fact-checking platforms, in particular, have been especially active. Another positive development is the emergence of cooperative frameworks both within Armenia and between Armenian and international civil society organizations, which represents a significant achievement. At the same time, civil society actors themselves note that narratives promoted through disinformation campaigns—particularly those targeting Armenia—have gained considerable traction among the public, especially among younger audiences. This constitutes a serious challenge, the true scale of which can only be understood through comprehensive and in-depth research.
Engagement with different segments of society in Yerevan and the regions, along with training programs focused on hybrid threats, serve as important tools of resilience. Based on such interactions, only a small proportion of participants tend to initially adopt manipulative narratives associated with hybrid threats. The majority—particularly by the end of these programs—develop a clear understanding of the nature of hybrid attacks and recognize that Armenia is being targeted, primarily by the Kremlin. Although participants may still struggle to articulate these issues precisely or define them in formal terms, the groups engaged in such initiatives nonetheless provide valuable insight into broader public perceptions.
Overall, the effectiveness of civil society organizations (CSOs) in countering hybrid threats depends on a number of factors. First and foremost, it is essential that these organizations incorporate targeted—albeit sometimes short-term—programs specifically focused on hybrid threats into their agendas. The greater the number of organizations prioritizing this issue, the more effective the overall response is likely to be. At the same time, effectiveness also requires a degree of coordination among CSOs. This is critical to avoid duplication of efforts and resources, enabling the creation of shared information platforms and more systematic response mechanisms. It also allows limited financial and human resources to be used more strategically, ensuring more targeted outcomes.
Equally important is cooperation between CSOs and state institutions. As in conventional warfare—where states are more effective when public institutions and societal actors operate in tandem—the same principle applies here: cooperation enhances effectiveness, given that hybrid attacks constitute external interference aimed at weakening the resilience of both the state and society. However, the idea of such cooperation is not yet widely embraced among Armenian CSOs, for several reasons.
First, there are concerns that engagement with state institutions could undermine perceptions of independence and neutrality, exposing organizations to accusations of serving government interests. Second, there is a degree of mutual distrust between state bodies and segments of civil society. Finally, no effective and widely accepted model of cooperation has yet been established. Further research in this area would be highly valuable. As a potential example, one could envision the creation of a joint coordination body to streamline and align the diverse activities aimed at countering hybrid threats.
In Armenia’s case, the study of international experience is particularly valuable. Of special relevance is the Moldovan example, where, for instance, the Center for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation (Stratcom) has been established. Moldova created a specialized state institution whose mandate goes beyond simply debunking false information; it also focuses on developing narratives that neutralize it. The center works closely with civil society organizations and independent journalists. In Moldova, considerable emphasis has been placed not only on debunking—that is, exposing already circulating falsehoods—but also, more importantly, on prebunking, which involves proactively educating the public about how manipulation works (for example, how emotions, fear, or fake experts are exploited). It is also worth highlighting the work of investigative journalists in Moldova. Several journalists have gone undercover within Russian and pro-Russian groups established to influence elections illegally, recording and documenting internal operations. Their investigations have demonstrated that significant financial resources and disinformation flows originating from Russia are directed toward influencing voter behavior, fueling domestic political tensions, and undermining public trust in state institutions.
For Armenian civil society organizations and activists, investigative work aimed at exposing external interference in elections and effectively countering it is particularly relevant today. This is especially important in light of circulating reports about financial flows originating from Russia, allegedly intended to purchase votes in various forms and influence electoral outcomes.
Edgar Vardanyan
