Foreign orchestrated disinformation, cyberattacks, the creation of an environment of uncertainty, psychological targeting, and other instruments of hybrid technologies become particularly active during periods that are critical for a state—when domestic or external political processes place individuals and political forces under the imperative of making strategic decisions. The Republic of Armenia is currently going through such a pivotal period.
The new regional status quo that has emerged, within a broader context of crisis in international relations and ongoing geopolitical transformation, has created the necessity of taking important decisions. Naturally, such decisions cannot satisfy all interested stakeholders. As a result, “discontented” states attempt to exert influence through the means available to them, seeking to bring about changes either in the decisions themselves or in those who make them. At present, Armenia is facing significant hybrid attacks, and the need to respond to them adequately stems from the imperative of preserving statehood and strengthening sovereignty.
This article examines how the public administration system of the Republic of Armenia is being targeted, and what role it plays within the broader framework of the state’s responsibility to resist hybrid threats.
Modern hybrid technologies include not only direct actions—such as cyberattacks, pressure on businesses, operations conducted by organized disruptive groups, and similar tools—but also multidimensional and coordinated pressure on the public administration system itself. The objective of such attacks is the collapse of state governance functionality, which is intended to lead to institutional erosion and breakdown. Although such activities are carried out continuously, they typically intensify sharply during pre-election periods.
In such phases, the focus of attention, manipulation efforts, and allocation of resources toward the public administration system are usually aimed at weakening the position of the political force in power ahead of elections, enhancing the prospects of alternative candidates, delegitimizing the electoral process, creating an environment of uncertainty, and influencing free opinion formation and voting behavior, among other objectives.
The public administration system is targeted through the continuous amplification of disinformation, interference in and disruption of information systems, and various forms of system malfunction and destabilization. Each of these methods requires an appropriate level of expertise in response and a certain degree of institutional resilience.
Disinformation is a broad concept that encompasses a wide range of actions—from manipulations of information itself (its construction, alteration, distortion, disproportionate interpretation, and so on) to motivational and demotivational techniques (such as the promotion of reciprocity, false equivalence, flattery or denigration, and similar methods). These are used both in a targeted manner, focusing on specific branches of the state system, individual departments, or even particular individuals, and in a broad-front approach affecting the system as a whole.
The challenge of countering disinformation confronts the public administration systems of all countries. Even states such as those of the European Union or the United States are not immune to disinformation. Significant efforts are being undertaken in these countries to enhance the resilience of their state systems against such threats.
One of the main challenges facing the public administration system of Armenia is the incompleteness of its institutional core. For years, the system has combined, on the one hand, a highly hierarchical structure and, on the other, a fragmented distribution of responsibility. As a result, a culture of decision-making accompanied by clear accountability has not been sufficiently institutionalized within public administration. In other words, within the middle and lower levels of Armenia’s public administration system, understandings of one’s own functions and their impact on the system as a whole do not correspond to contemporary challenges.
The performance evaluation system, in turn, also fails to meet modern high standards, which further demotivates mid- and lower-level officials to assume responsibility within the scope of their duties.
Such a situation creates fertile ground for targeting through disinformation. In this case, a hybrid strike becomes doubly effective. On the one hand, under such influence, the institution begins to demonstrate progressively declining efficiency, which contributes to the continuous multiplication of uncertainty. On the other hand, public trust in that institution steadily decreases, which in turn makes it increasingly easier to generate and disseminate false and manipulative information at each subsequent level.
With the aim of countering disinformation, in 2023 the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia adopted a decision approving the “Concept for Combating Disinformation in the Republic of Armenia for 2024–2026 and the Action Plan Derived Therefrom.” The concept includes a number of directions, including in particular:
● The launch of more transparent and accountable operational formats and platforms within state bodies, as well as the improvement of existing resources;
● The enhancement of the work of communication specialists in state institutions, and the development of media literacy and fact-checking skills;
● Ensuring active cooperation between the state and the private sector in combating disinformation.
The concept covers several important areas and proposes solutions to a number of problematic issues. For example, it introduces mechanisms for improving media literacy, proactive public communication by civil servants, the effectiveness of communication systems, regular training programs, and so on. However, it lacks an essential imperative: the delegation process and the redistribution of responsibility within the middle and lower levels of the administrative hierarchy.
Meanwhile, these elements are of critical importance for enabling public administration officials to play an active role in countering disinformation and, consequently, to avoid becoming conduits for disinformation within communication flows—or even better, to act as filters that interrupt such flows. In this regard, a decisive role could be played by increasing the degree of autonomy granted by senior-level officials to middle and lower-level administrators in
decision-making processes, as well as by institutionalizing a culture of responsibility-taking within their respective areas of competence.
On the other hand, it should be noted that a purely competitive approach by the state in countering disinformation flows—namely, the dissemination of accurate information and the improvement of communication efficiency between the public administration system and society—is not sufficient to address the current challenges. A firm response from the law enforcement system is also necessary, aimed at identifying the sources of disinformation and holding them accountable. However, even a superficial assessment of the situation shows that the problems in this area are enormous.
In addition to external sources of disinformation, extensive networks operate within Armenia that are involved in its creation and dissemination. These networks are not only left unaccountable, but in some cases also benefit from private and foreign funding and, in certain instances, even from the support of units within the state administration system itself. Armenia is currently facing an unprecedented wave of false and distorted information, which would, under normal circumstances, require a firm and systematic response from the law enforcement system in the face of both internal and external threats.
Another form of hybrid attack against the public administration system of the Republic of Armenia can be observed in the form of unlawful interference in service and information systems, as well as their disruption. In this case, digital technologies are used to introduce distortions into institutional operations, to create manipulated perceptions of their functioning, to exert targeted influence on the morale and psychological state of employees, to disrupt workflows, and consequently to generate dissatisfaction with the institution itself.
The imperative of responding adequately to this challenge is not limited to technical and security measures alone. It is also necessary to work on strengthening the morale and psychological resilience of lower-level employees, as well as improving their skills in self-control in crisis situations.
Conclusion
In contemporary conditions, the public administration system is one of the key pillars of state security. Strengthening both institutional and targeted mechanisms within this system to counter hybrid threats is an imperative that must be placed on an automated and continuous basis. At the same time, the means of countering disinformation and illegal influence mechanisms, as well as the continuous improvement of the effectiveness of law enforcement institutions, are foundational elements without which the state cannot withstand coordinated multidimensional attacks.
Today, the Republic of Armenia finds itself under multifaceted and diverse hybrid attacks, which makes it imperative to pay particular attention and exercise consistency in improving and effectively implementing the functions of the public administration system in response to these challenges.
Robert Ghevondyan
