Russia’s large-scale economic pressure campaign against Armenia during the pre-election period failed to produce the outcome Moscow had anticipated. Armenian voters made a sovereign choice, granting the Civil Contract party another term in office. Accordingly, it was widely expected that, following the elections, Russia would soften its position and seek to engage with the Armenian authorities in a more cooperative manner, with the aim of avoiding a further deepening of the bilateral crisis. The Kremlin, however, has chosen a different course. It appears to have opted to intensify its pressure in an open attempt to constrain Armenia’s sovereignty.
Accordingly, about one month after the elections, Russia blocked imports of dairy products from Armenia. On 4 August, it was also reported that Russia had blocked imports of shipments of Bjni mineral water, certain non-alcoholic beverages, and spring water exported from Armenia. Persistent reports have also been circulating about a possible revision of natural gas prices by the end of the year. Nor are the pressure measures limited to these steps: the import restrictions are expected to be extended to additional categories of Armenian products in the coming months.
In essence, the principal instruments of Russia’s hybrid actions against Armenia remain economic and energy-related. Political, cultural, terrorist, and criminal-subculture levers have, for various reasons, largely ceased to be effective. Consequently, Moscow has decided to make full use of its remaining leverage in an effort to prevent the further consolidation of Armenia’s sovereignty. Nevertheless, recent developments indicate that these instruments, too, are failing to produce the desired results. Following the elections, the Armenian government has continued to pursue a multi-vector foreign policy. Dependence on Russia is steadily declining, with the economic dimension playing an increasingly important role in this process. While Russia seeks to exert economic pressure, Armenia is discovering new markets that Armenian businesses had previously overlooked due to their disproportionate focus on the EAEU market. Although challenges remain with respect to certain products, economic diversification is proceeding at a remarkable pace. In the energy sector, Armenia likewise has alternatives regarding the construction of a new nuclear reactor—alternatives that, in themselves, represent a source of concern for Russia. It is therefore no coincidence that, alongside economic coercion, the leadership of Rosatom has repeatedly presented Armenia with attractive proposals to build a new Russian nuclear reactor. The Armenian authorities, however, are most likely to opt for a different offer. An increase in natural gas prices could create short-term difficulties, but here, too, Armenia has alternatives in the form of Iranian, Turkmen, and now Azerbaijani gas. Consequently, in the near future, Russian gas may find itself simply competing in the market, a prospect that would limit the Kremlin’s ability to use gas prices as a tool of coercion against Armenia. In conclusion, Russia’s escalating pressure is producing the opposite effect. Armenia is steadily breaking free from excessive Russian influence while diversifying its economy.
This is something that the Kremlin, it seems, has yet to recognize—but that is ultimately Russia’s problem.
