The Constitutional Court upheld the election results, meaning that the new National Assembly will once again include two opposition factions, just as the previous one did. As many had anticipated—including myself—the opposition political forces that crossed the electoral threshold announced that they would take up their parliamentary mandates. Their stated rationale is that these mandates constitute a “weapon” in the struggle for a change of government and that they intend to combine parliamentary activity with street protests in pursuit of that objective.
It should also be recalled that these same political forces maintain that the elections were fraudulent. According to that logic, the parliament itself cannot be considered legitimate.
In other words, they openly declare from the outset that they do not intend to use their mandates primarily for the purpose of carrying out the traditional functions of a parliamentary opposition, but rather as an instrument for coming to power. Put differently, their position can be summarized as follows: “We were unable to come to power through the elections because the elections were rigged; therefore, we will seek to achieve that goal through other means, and we will use our parliamentary mandates for that purpose.”
Meanwhile, according to the ruling of the Constitutional Court, as well as the assessments of both international and domestic election observation missions, the people expressed their will through genuine and legitimate elections. Those elections produced a parliamentary majority that is entrusted with forming the government, alongside a parliamentary minority whose role is to serve as the opposition.
The term “opposition” does not merely describe a political force’s stance toward the government. Within a parliamentary system, the parliamentary opposition is a constitutional and political institution endowed with rights established by law and entrusted with clearly defined functions.
However, based on the statements made by the political forces that entered parliament, it appears that the opposition factions do not intend to perform the traditional functions of a parliamentary opposition. Instead, they plan to use one of the key institutions of democracy—the parliament itself—to advance their own agenda of bringing about a change of government. In practical terms, this means that Armenia is once again unlikely to have a functioning parliamentary opposition. Legally, such an opposition will exist, but in reality taxpayers will be financing activities that fall outside the scope of parliamentary opposition.
The opposition may, of course, argue that if a sufficient number of deputies from the Civil Contract faction were to leave the ruling majority and join the opposition, a new government could be formed through lawful parliamentary procedures, without holding new elections. Theoretically, this is indeed possible, and it is a legitimate mechanism characteristic of parliamentary systems. However, if one believes that parliament itself is illegitimate, how can one simultaneously intend to use that same “illegitimate” parliament to establish a new government? Moreover, placing one’s hopes on persuading or inducing MPs to defect has already proven to be an ineffective strategy.
From a legal standpoint, there appears to be no mechanism for sanctioning a political force that enters parliament but fails to carry out its institutional responsibilities or remains largely inactive. Members of parliament, for example, do not lose their mandates for such inactivity. The more important question, however, is whether it is fair for taxpayers to finance that inactivity and, in doing so, indirectly support a political agenda aimed at coming to power without elections.
It is also worth recalling that this was not the agenda the opposition presented during the election campaign. Their message was exclusively one of winning the election. Indeed, opposition leaders argued
that these elections represented Armenia’s last opportunity to save the country from destruction, from becoming a “vilayet,” and from “Turkification.” They claimed that a victory for Civil Contract would amount to Armenia’s downfall. Were they, then, misleading their own supporters? And if so, are those supporters now prepared to accept the reality that has emerged?
Another issue concerns the way in which those opposition forces obtained their votes. In essence, the political force that was formed shortly before the elections—the Strong Armenia alliance—received approximately 340,000 votes (around 23.3% of the total vote) and became the second-largest political force in Armenia. How is that possible? Who are the key figures behind this force? Many of them were people who had shown little or no political activity beforehand, and the majority of the names on the electoral list are unfamiliar even to citizens who closely follow public and civic life. The alliance’s candidate for prime minister, Samvel Karapetyan, does not even meet the formal eligibility criteria required for a prime-ministerial candidate. One might ask whether they presented an exceptional, evidence-based, research-driven program worthy of a Nobel Prize. Yet, upon examining the program, one can hardly arrive at such a conclusion.
How, then, did this newly created political entity become the country’s second political force? In my view, the answer is obvious. This became possible primarily because of the figure of the Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan and his enormous financial resources. Enormous financial resources mean numerous campaign headquarters, extensive advertising, the ability to recruit large numbers of activists, strong media visibility, the capacity to hire expensive political consultants, and so forth. This does not mean, of course, that all citizens who voted for the alliance did so because of money alone. Nevertheless, it is evident that Karapetyan himself and his vast financial resources were among the most important—if not the single most important—factors shaping the electoral result of Strong Armenia.
It should also be noted that, almost every day during the campaign, law enforcement authorities released audio recordings in which individuals speaking on behalf of opposition, pro-Russian political forces—or representatives of those forces themselves—were allegedly discussing the distribution of vote-buying bribes. Whether, and to what extent, these practices influenced voter behavior is a question that can only be answered through comprehensive empirical research. In my view, they could have had a significant impact on the electorate’s choices.
In essence, however, the Constitutional Court did not answer the question of whether vote-buying affected the free expression of voters’ will and thereby undermined the integrity of the electoral process. The Court concluded that the published recordings and the pending criminal proceedings did not provide a sufficient basis for making such an assessment. It stated:
“Although the reports issued by law enforcement authorities concerning a number of corruption-related offenses committed during the electoral process, the criminal proceedings referred to therein, and the large number of individuals involved in those proceedings (particularly with respect to vote-buying) may, at first glance, indicate a substantial impact on the free formation of voters’ will, the Constitutional Court nevertheless finds that these circumstances do not constitute a sufficient basis, within the meaning of Article 77(14) of the Constitutional Law On the Constitutional Court, for reaching a definitive conclusion as to their impact on the final election results.”
In essence, the Constitutional Court acknowledged that the number of individuals allegedly involved in vote-buying schemes was substantial. At the same time, it held that this fact alone was insufficient to conclude that such practices had affected the final election outcome. It is equally important to note, however, that the Court did not conclude that vote-buying had not influenced the elections. Rather, it stated only that, on the basis of the evidence available, it was unable to make such a determination.
This raises another important question: what, then, would constitute sufficient evidence to establish that vote-buying or other unlawful interference with voters’ free choice affected the election results? It is evident that judicial proceedings require time, and final court judgments are typically issued only after elections have taken place. Consequently, large-scale vote-buying in support of a particular political force could occur, potentially contributing to a strong electoral performance, yet if no final judicial rulings exist at the time, the election results may be impossible to challenge successfully. Furthermore, if court judgments are delivered later confirming that extensive vote-buying did in fact occur would the electoral results of that political force nevertheless remain unchanged?
In my view, these questions warrant broad public discussion, accompanied by rigorous expert research and legal analysis.
Finally, voters’ behavior may also have been influenced by the hybrid threats employed by the Kremlin, a subject I have examined in several of my previous articles. Indeed, international media outlets, citing Western intelligence sources and official documents, have reported that the elections were accompanied by active covert efforts by Russia to weaken Prime Minister Pashinyan and support pro-Russian candidates, including through disinformation campaigns.
To achieve a different outcome in future elections, I believe that several priorities should be addressed.
1. Ensure full transparency in the financing of political parties and electoral alliances, including the timely disclosure of campaign headquarters, advertising expenditures, and any potential foreign sources of funding.
2. Strengthen the capacity of law enforcement agencies and the judiciary to detect, investigate, and prosecute cases of vote-buying effectively.
3. Develop institutional resilience against foreign hybrid interference and disinformation, enabling democratic institutions and society to better withstand external manipulation.
4. Review the standards applied by the courts when adjudicating electoral disputes, so that they possess effective legal tools for assessing the impact of vote-buying and the potential misuse of administrative resources on election outcomes.
5. Promote a political culture in which a parliamentary mandate is understood as a tool for legislation and democratic oversight, rather than primarily as an additional resource for pursuing a change of government through extra-parliamentary or street-based political action.
Without these measures, each subsequent election is likely to reproduce the same pattern. The state must establish mechanisms that ensure anti-democratic forces are never able to undermine democratic processes.
Edgar Vardanyan
This article was produced by the Armenian Council Research Center with the support of the Yerevan Office of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom in the South Caucasus.
The views and opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom or its staff.
