The capabilities of modern communication systems have led not only to the development of education, socialization, and public communication infrastructures, but also to new security challenges. One of the fundamental components of state, societal, and individual security has become information security. Moreover, in contemporary conflicts, the informational and communicational sphere has become an inseparable element of hybrid operations, primarily through the manipulation of public opinion. Clear examples of such phenomena are Russia’s media campaigns against Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. From the perspective of national security, control over the information domain is a critically important component, particularly in terms of information security.
It is noteworthy that in the era of hybrid technologies, the informational and communicational sphere is used not only against states that are in direct confrontation with one another, but, in certain cases, even against allied or partner countries. This enables the initiating state of hybrid campaigns to block processes that could lead to a reduction of its influence or to the adoption of decisions contrary to its interests. Such actions are especially widespread during sensitive periods—when vital decisions are being made, during electoral processes, or in times of political transformation.
Among the informational tools of hybrid operations, social networks stand out. They enable the rapid amplification of information reach, making them an attractive and effective channel for malicious actors to inject false, manipulative, misleading, or incoherent content into the information space. Their subsequent dissemination often occurs organically, especially when emotionally charged language is used, or when narratives involve societal sensitivities, real or fabricated events, high-profile incidents, or statements and actions of well-known figures. This logic underpins the phenomenon of the “weaponization of social networks”.
The capabilities of social networks in Armenia, as in the rest of the world, have significantly expanded. While in the past they were primarily used against Armenia within the framework of Azerbaijani and Turkish hybrid operations, in the current period Russia has become the main center of informational pressure against Armenia on social platforms.
Armenia, as a target of hybrid attacks, has acquired particular significance since 2022, when the Armenian authorities recognized the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. This marked the beginning of a long-standing conflict resolution process, which did not align with Russia’s calculations of maintaining leverage over both countries through the persistence of the conflict. From that moment onward, processes targeting Armenia in social networks became increasingly visible, and their scale and intensity grew significantly in 2025–2026.
This development is also linked to the parliamentary elections scheduled in Armenia for June 7, 2026, in which Russia is understood to have its preferred political force.
Facebook and Instagram are actively used not only as tools for targeted influence, but also as platforms for broader media dissemination. Virtually all relatively well-known media outlets have their own Facebook pages, many of which operate according to a networked logic. In this manner, media platforms create interconnected channels of mutual information sharing, through which they widely circulate content received from specific centers, introducing only marginal changes and, at times, failing to indicate the original source from which the information was obtained. This, in turn, complicates the process of tracing the original source.
Moreover, false information is sometimes “recirculated backward”: one media outlet refers to another outlet that had originally obtained the information from it, thereby generating a circular chain of attribution that further obscures the identification of the primary source. This mechanism not only enables wide-scale dissemination but also misleads the public by making it significantly more difficult to verify information through source tracing. As an example, one may refer to the information regarding the opening of the Armenia–Turkey border in December 2025, which was initially circulated by the Russian outlet Lenta.ru, yet several Armenian media outlets cited Turkish or Azerbaijani sources, some of which, in turn, referred back to Armenian outlets.
The Facebook platform is also distinguished by the fact that it provides users with access to information from other social networks. The promotion of YouTube and Telegram channels on Facebook has become a routine practice. External links to other platforms allow for a significant multiplication of viewership. Taking advantage of this functionality, Russian disinformation “apparatus” create fabricated content or distort and manipulate real events, which are subsequently published on other platforms and then reintroduced into Facebook, often accompanied by paid promotion.
Another important hybrid tool has become the Telegram platform. It serves as a powerful instrument for the dissemination of disinformation, manipulation of public opinion, shaping of societal moods, and fostering distrust toward state institutions. The spread of anti-Armenian content and disinformation in this space also reflects the application of strategies that are characteristic of hybrid warfare. Numerous media channels and publicly recognized individuals operating on Telegram enable the rapid dissemination of information to very large audiences, a feature that is extensively exploited for the distribution of disinformation.
TikTok as a Key Platform for the Dissemination of Disinformation
The TikTok platform is also an important channel for the spread of disinformation. It primarily enables the distribution of short videos lasting from a few seconds to several minutes. This format generates significant interest, as short-form videos function as a “mass-consumption product” within the social media environment.
Although well-known Armenian users on this platform generally avoid involvement in disinformation networks, numerous new accounts are being created with the purpose of spreading manipulative content through short videos. Later, similar to content circulating on Telegram, such materials are promoted through paid advertising on other social networks—primarily Facebook.
The freedom of social networks in Armenia, while serving as a democratic instrument and a means of free information dissemination, also presents a challenge when viewed through the lens of hybrid operations. Although law enforcement agencies, other state bodies, representatives of civil society, and other informed actors use the same platforms and tools to develop mechanisms of resistance and counter-disinformation efforts, the activities of numerous systematized and professionally organized disinformation “apparatuses” remain significantly more effective. This is evidenced by the high visibility and wide circulation of false and manipulative information, even in cases where it is formally refuted with objective evidence.
The combined impact of Russian-origin platforms, together with the activities of network structures operating within Armenia, often produces a difficult-to-manage, unstable, and at times chaotic informational environment, which in turn becomes fertile ground for the spread of anti-state sentiments.
Nevertheless, in essence, the only viable means of countering hybrid technologies in social networks remains the continuous expansion of access to accurate information, which must necessarily be accompanied by a general increase in the population’s digital literacy. It is evident that the efforts of state institutions in this direction remain limited. Civil society organizations can play a key role in this process.
At the same time, given the limited resources of these organizations and their dependence on external sources of funding, it should be a matter of state concern to ensure the state-centered orientation of their activities and to prevent cases of unlawful conduct, involvement in anti-state propaganda, or participation in disinformation campaigns. Cooperation between civil society organizations and the state can also play an important role in this regard. For this purpose, there is a need to reconsider the logic of public resource allocation, including the participation of certain civil society organizations in this framework. This could be achieved, for example, through the provision of certain tax incentives to economic actors involved in funding civil society initiatives.
The role of social networks in Armenia today can hardly be overstated. At the same time, they have also created new opportunities for malicious actors, and the obligation of both the state and society to respond to these challenges stems from the logic of fundamental human rights as well as Armenia’s existential security concerns.
