The process of establishing peace in the South Caucasus, despite certain positive developments, continues to be accompanied by complex and often contradictory narratives. In contemporary political science, the reconfiguration of historical narratives by states frequently serves as an instrument of foreign policy.
In the immediate aftermath of the 44-day war, Baku embarked on this trajectory by advancing a far-reaching conceptual framework referred to as “Western Azerbaijan.” This narrative constitutes a state-funded and state-orchestrated project aimed at casting doubt on the territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia, while constructing a parallel reality in which the entire sovereign territory of Armenia is portrayed as “Azerbaijani historical land.”
The issue extends well beyond the confines of a purely historiographical debate; it has effectively been transposed into the domain of hybrid warfare, where media manipulation, social media ecosystems, and pseudo-legal formulations are employed in service of the aforementioned objectives.
Rebuttal of Historical and Legal Claims
The “Western Azerbaijan” thesis is grounded in historical revisionism that contradicts both established academic scholarship and the fundamental principles of international law. From a legal perspective, the borders of the Republic of Armenia are recognized by the international community and the United Nations. Moreover, under the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration, Azerbaijan formally recognized Armenia’s territorial integrity within its former Soviet administrative borders, while Armenia, in turn, recognized Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity on the same basis[i].
The claims advanced by Baku regarding toponymic changes and alleged ethnic cleansing lack a credible evidentiary basis. Historically, assertions about the “indigenous” presence of Azerbaijanis in this part of the Armenian Highland are not supported by medieval or early modern primary sources.
The narrative deliberately disregards the fact that population movements in the 20th century were largely the result of reciprocal conflicts, rather than the unilateral exercise of “historical rights” by any one side.[ii] [iii]
Mirror Narratives: The Artificial Parallels Between Artsakh and “Western Azerbaijan”
Since 2022, official Baku has increasingly employed a strategy of “mirroring,” presenting the issue of “Western Azerbaijan” as a direct counterpart to the Artsakh question and thereby constructing a false legal and moral equivalence. Within this narrative, if Armenians advocate for the protection of the rights of the Armenian population of Artsakh, Azerbaijan, in turn, claims a corresponding “right” to demand the “return” of Azerbaijanis to Yerevan, Syunik, and Gegharkunik—territories to which it has even sought to assign overtly Azerbaijani toponyms.
This parallelism rests on clear historical and legal inconsistencies:
- The Statehood Factor. Unlike the constructed notion of “Western Azerbaijan,” Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) has, over the course of millennia, exhibited various forms of Armenian self-governance and, until 2023, maintained de facto statehood, albeit unrecognized[iv]. From antiquity and through the medieval period, Artsakh constituted one of the provinces of Greater Armenia and, in later periods, preserved elements of autonomy through the Armenian melikdoms (semi-autonomous principalities) of Khamsa.
- Legal Foundations. Prior to the forced depopulation of Armenians from Artsakh, the conflict was internationally recognized as an ethno-political dispute grounded in the principle of the right to self-determination. By contrast, “Western Azerbaijan” is a purely political construct lacking any legal standing in international forums.
- Existential Threat. The issue of the Armenians of Artsakh has consistently been one of physical survival and security, a reality underscored by the ethnic cleansing of 2023. In contrast, the emerging narrative promoted by Baku is driven by explicitly expansionist objectives[v].
Geopolitical Perspective: Legitimation and Targeting of Sovereignty
The “Western Azerbaijan Community” organization was established on 3 August 2022 as the legal successor to the “Union of Azerbaijani Refugees,” which had operated since 1989, and has effectively evolved into a key instrument of Azerbaijani foreign policy. The official launch of its activities can be traced to 24 December 2022, when Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev stated: “The present territory of Armenia is our historical land… We must develop a ‘Return Concept’.”[vi]
The activation of the “Western Azerbaijan” thesis constitutes a serious obstacle to the peace process. State-level propaganda operates in a coordinated manner across several layers:
- Television propaganda. Programs such as “Western Azerbaijan Chronicle” (Qərbi Azərbaycan xronikası) on Baku TV and weekly broadcasts on AzTV systematically present the regions and cities of Armenia as “territories occupied by Armenians.” This framing is intended to normalize the idea of future expansion within Azerbaijani society and to construct the perception of the territory of Armenia as a “historical homeland.” For instance, Baku TV has published more than 883 videos under this rubric on its YouTube platform. On 27 February 2026, it aired a report titled “We have never forgotten Zangezur, sooner or later we will return,” emphasizing the so-called necessity of the “return” of the Syunik region. [vii]
- State news agencies. AZERTAC serves as a primary disseminator of this information, saturating the media space with such narratives. Between 1 January and 11 April 2026 alone, the agency published 118 materials related to this discourse[viii]. In March of the same year, pro-government outlets including Report.az and others covered the presentation of the book “Explanatory Dictionary of Toponyms of Western Zangezur.” [ix] Shortly thereafter, the same community issued a statement addressed to European parliamentarians, drawing parallels between the forced displacement of Armenians from Artsakh and the alleged displacement of Azerbaijanis from “Western Azerbaijan,” in an attempt to place both issues on an equivalent international plane[x]. In early April, the same group held meetings with Uzbek and Kyrgyz writers, promoting the “return” narrative in an international cultural context[xi].
- Social media. Social networks regularly circulate videos depicting Azerbaijanis “visiting” regions of Armenia, allegedly to pay respects at ancestral graves[xii]. This practice functions, in effect, as a tool for conditioning Armenian society toward the normalization of Azerbaijani presence. While reciprocal visits to cemeteries could be considered a normal humanitarian gesture, the framing changes fundamentally when these territories are simultaneously defined as “historical Azerbaijani land” in official discourse. Through this method, Baku also targets its domestic audience, reinforcing the ideology of “return.” The strategy does not require immediate military action but instead generates sustained informational pressure over the long term.
Conclusion
Despite the Washington Declaration of 8 August 2025 and the ongoing discourse on normalization, Azerbaijan continues to circulate the false narrative of “Western Azerbaijan.” The reasons are strategic in nature: it functions as a lever in diplomatic negotiations, sustains domestic mobilization, and constructs a narrative of “historical justice.” At the same time, it enables sustained pressure on Armenia without incurring direct military risks. The “Western Azerbaijan” narrative is not about the past, but about the future. Its long-term objective is to create pseudo-legal and propagandistic grounds for the gradual degradation of Armenia’s sovereignty. The use of mirror narratives demonstrates that Azerbaijan seeks to close the chapter on the Karabakh issue while simultaneously opening a new platform for demands against Armenia.
In this context, a passive observer posture on the part of Armenia would be detrimental. A comprehensive political, analytical, and security-based response framework is required, grounded in the following principles:
- Legal emphasis. The Republic of Armenia must formulate a clear and consistent position in all international forums regarding Azerbaijan’s constructed “Western Azerbaijan” project. Armenian diplomacy must clearly distinguish between the forced displacement of the Armenian population of Artsakh and the expansionist narrative advanced by Azerbaijan.
- Information counter-offensive. It is necessary to develop an accessible international academic and research base demonstrating the artificial nature of Azerbaijani toponymic constructions.
- Resilience enhancement. Armenia’s external intelligence and national security structures should undertake effective measures to mitigate the impact of Azerbaijani psychological operations on Armenian society.
- Geopolitical deterrence. Armenia’s current diplomatic response to the “Western Azerbaijan” thesis remains largely reactive. While international partners have been made aware of Azerbaijan’s expansionist ambitions, a clear deterrence mechanism capable of compelling Baku to abandon this narrative has yet to emerge. Therefore, to achieve meaningful impact, it is necessary to move beyond political statements toward an integrated informational-legal strategy, systematically deconstructing the historical falsifications and demonstrating to the international community that this concept is not a matter of “return rights,” but rather an attempt to legitimize the forced reconfiguration of the regional security architecture.
[i] Recognition of Borders under the Alma-Ata Declaration https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32069364.html
[ii] De Waal, Thomas (2003). Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War. New York University
[iii] Press; Galichian, Rouben (2004). Historic Maps of Armenia: The Cartographic Heritage. I.B. Tauris.
[iv] Caspersen, Nina (2012). Unrecognized States: The Struggle for Sovereignty in the Modern International System.
[v] European Parliament Resolution on Ethnic Cleansing in Artsakh
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2023-0356_EN.html
[vi] Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the “Western Azerbaijan Community” (24 December 2022)
https://president.az/az/articles/view/58330
[vii] Baku TV Report on the “Return” to Syunik (27 February 2026)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YcIzzHSuKUs
[viii] List of Publications by the AZƏRTAC Agency (January–April 2026)
https://azertag.az/axtarish?cat_all=1&search=q%C9%99rbi+az%C9%99rbaycan…
[ix] Report.az: Presentation of the “Dictionary of Toponyms of Western Zangezur”
https://report.az/daxili-siyaset/qerbi-zengezur-toponimlerinin-izahli-lugeti-kitabinin-teqdimati-kecirilib
[x] Report.az: Statement of the Community Addressed to European Parliamentarians
https://report.az/xarici-siyaset/qerbi-azerbaycan-icmasi-avropali-parlamentarilerin-ittihamlarini-qinayib
[xi] Report.az: Meeting with Uzbek and Kyrgyz Writers
https://report.az/edebiyyat/qerbi-azerbaycan-icmasinda-ozbek-ve-qirgiz-yazicilarla-gorus-kecirilib
[xii] Video on Azerbaijanis’ “Visit” to Armenia
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N7GqshBCHxE
