When the leaders of the four EAEU member states gathered for the summit in Astana on May 29 and decided to call on Armenia to hold a referendum as soon as possible on whether to join the European Union or remain in the EAEU, they could hardly have anticipated that their appeal might actually accelerate Armenia’s European integration process. Yet this is precisely what happened: on August 24, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced from the National Assembly podium the possible launch of a process to submit an EU membership application, also referring to the statement adopted at the EAEU summit.
In essence, the law adopted by Armenia in 2025 on launching the process of EU membership did not establish any urgency, deadlines, or sequence of mandatory actions. It is a legislative act setting out broad objectives and a general direction. It can be observed that over the past year and a half, although Armenia has undertaken substantial efforts to strengthen Armenia-EU ties and deepen cooperation, these efforts have largely not been related to the actual mechanisms of EU accession. And now, on the eve of Armenia’s parliamentary elections, the adoption of such a statement by the EAEU changes the logic of the game.
Can it be assumed that the statement was merely a pretext and that the Armenian authorities had already intended to launch the process? Certainly, such an assumption is plausible. However, it is equally plausible that Russia’s repeated demands for Armenia to hold a referendum, together with the statement adopted with EAEU partners, served as a catalyst. The fact remains that, once again, Russia’s actions are undermining its own interests and accelerating the very process of Russia’s declining influence.
Within just five or six months, restrictions imposed on imports from Armenia of agricultural products, dairy products, flowers, and a number of other goods helped accelerate economic diversification. As a result, Armenian businesses began entering markets that had previously remained largely untapped, while the European Union, in turn, provided certain advantages for the export of Armenian products. This ran counter to Russia’s expectations and forecasts.
In another instance, by exerting pressure on Armenia and demanding that it hold a referendum quickly, Russia is once again losing ground, effectively accelerating Armenia’s European integration process. This time, however, it is not only Armenia-Russia relations that are being put under pressure—relations that are already far removed from the level of a “strategic alliance”—but the functioning of the EAEU as a whole. Ultimately, if Armenia leaves the Eurasian Economic Union, this could be regarded as the beginning of the end for the organization. It can be anticipated that, in the not-too-distant future, the economic expansion project known as the EAEU may be left with only Putin’s Russia and its satellite Belarus—and even that only if Belarusian dictator Lukashenko has not already lost power.
