This analytical article examines two key and, at the same time, interconnected concepts that currently shape Armenia’s political landscape: the strengthening of sovereignty and the diversification of foreign policy. Strengthening sovereignty will enable Armenia to pursue a diversified foreign policy. This, in turn, will naturally contribute to expanding the country’s sovereign capacity and room for maneuver. Conversely, any weakening of sovereignty will result in a regression toward the long-standing “geopolitical trap,” the persistence of which will continue to constrain the country’s sovereignty while carrying numerous risks within it.
It is a well-known fact that the concept of “state sovereignty,” having emerged during the Age of Enlightenment, was formally enshrined in the Peace of Westphalia treaties in 1648. In the context of international relations, this concept implies, in particular, that states are capable of independently choosing the course of their foreign policy in accordance with their own interests. In other words, they are presumed to be free in determining the means and methods through which they pursue and defend those interests. In today’s world, of course, it is difficult to identify a state that enjoys absolute independence in its foreign policy actions. Such a characterization could apply only to great powers, and even then, with significant reservations. One may argue that the more powerful a state is, the broader its sphere of freedom of action becomes. All states seek to expand that sphere in pursuit of a more effective advancement of their interests. This applies to Armenia as well. One of the central imperatives of Armenia’s contemporary foreign policy can be formulated precisely in these terms.
Let us now examine the challenges Armenia faces in this regard.
In the contemporary world, states are constrained in their foreign policy conduct by international law, international obligations, human rights norms, and other such factors. State sovereignty is inherently limited by these very considerations, and this is entirely normal. In Armenia’s case, however, the situation is somewhat different. There exists an additional factor that sharply restricts the country’s ability to choose its foreign policy trajectory. This factor has a direct impact on the provision of national security and, in particular, on the country’s prospects for economic development.
This factor may be described as a “geopolitical trap.” It has deep historical roots and has been present since the very first years of Armenia’s independence, gained in 1991. The “geopolitical trap” may be illustrated through the following framework:
- Armenia, being in conflict with Azerbaijan, which enjoys Turkey’s unconditional support, has from the outset faced severe security threats.
- In order to counter those threats, Armenia turned to Russia for assistance by signing relevant bilateral agreements and joining Russian-led multilateral military-political and trade-economic structures (the CSTO and the EAEU).
- As a consequence, Armenia’s foreign policy maneuverability and, in particular, its ability to pursue military-political and trade-economic cooperation with other countries and multilateral institutions became constrained.
- This, in turn, negatively affected both the effectiveness of measures aimed at ensuring Armenia’s security and the country’s ability to create the necessary preconditions for economic development.
Partnership with Russia did, during certain periods and under specific circumstances, play a positive role for Armenia. At the very least, it helped neutralize the Turkish factor. For a considerable period of time, this made it possible to preserve the balance of power with Azerbaijan. In the long run, however, that partnership failed to fulfill its mission.
First, during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, Turkey was able to provide Azerbaijan with full-scale support without undertaking any overtly aggressive action directly against Armenia that could have served as a formal basis for Russian military intervention. In other words, at the critical moment, the central pillar of the Armenia–Russia strategic partnership effectively collapsed — namely, the principle according to which aggression against one party would be regarded as aggression against the other as well. Furthermore, for many years Armenia was deprived of the opportunity to develop military-political cooperation with leading Western states. For a prolonged period, Armenia remained constrained, both physically and conceptually, in the modernization of its armed forces, which naturally could not but negatively affect the country’s defense capabilities and, ultimately, the outcome of the Forty-Four-Day War.
This state of constraint, which was one of the manifestations of a severe deficit of sovereignty, was also characteristic of the economic sphere. In 2013, Armenia abandoned negotiations on the Association Agreement, thereby losing the opportunity to establish a free trade area with the European Union.
Membership in the EAEU, which has a total population of around 180 million, while still providing certain short-term advantages mainly related to the export of agricultural products from Armenia and the import of energy resources from Russia, cannot in the long-term perspective serve as a foundation for ensuring the country’s sustainable development. To achieve that objective, it is necessary to be situated—or at least to strive to be situated—within the “gravitational field” of economically and technologically advanced countries. However, the EAEU member states can hardly be classified among the leaders of the modern world, neither in terms of the efficiency of their institutions nor in terms of their share in the global economy and international trade. By establishing a customs union, the EAEU limits its member states’ ability to engage in active trade and economic cooperation beyond its borders and to integrate into other economic frameworks. Being composed primarily of raw-material-exporting countries, the union does not generate complex supply chains within itself, nor does it ensure a sufficient level of trade turnover. As for the contemporary race for advanced technologies, the EAEU is not, in any meaningful sense, a relevant actor.
Being trapped in a “geopolitical trap,” Armenia has been deprived of the possibility to diversify its foreign policy tools and, consequently, the instruments serving its security and economic development. Diversification of foreign policy requires breaking out of this trap.
But how can this trap be overcome?
The “geopolitical trap” is based on the ideology of hostility with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Its lifespan is as long as that hostility persists. Therefore, the way out of the trap lies in breaking the vicious cycle of enmity. This requires the normalization of relations with Azerbaijan and the implementation of all the understandings reached between the parties in Washington on August 8, 2025. The normalization of relations with Azerbaijan would also open a broad window for the normalization of relations with Turkey. Stabilized relations with these two neighboring countries would create fundamental preconditions for the reopening of regional transport routes, their operation, and the development of regional trade and economic cooperation. This, in terms of creating conditions for economic development, is an essential requirement for any country. There is no country with closed borders and strained relations with two out of its four neighbors that has managed to ensure sustainable economic development. On the contrary, all those that have achieved long-term economic growth have done so on the basis of deep cooperation with their neighbors and close trade ties with the global economy.
Robust sovereignty is necessary in order to break free from the “geopolitical trap.” Today, Armenia stands before a choice: either to strengthen and expand its sovereignty, thereby gaining the capacity to make foreign policy decisions aligned with the state’s vital interests, or to continue living within the logic of the trap—namely, the logic of hostility. The first option opens a path toward peace and development. Whether or not that path can be fully utilized is a separate question, but at this stage, a sufficient level of sovereignty is required simply to begin moving along it.
As for the second option, as our recent painful history has demonstrated, it is a non-rational choice that leads to the resumption of tensions with our neighbors. Ultimately, it paves the way toward a loss of sovereignty, since it is grounded in hostility and operates through the mechanism of the “geopolitical trap,” whose functioning is periodically and inevitably disrupted, bringing in its wake irreversible losses.
Hrachya Tashchyan
