Hrachya Tashchyan
This article seeks to clarify the motivations behind U.S. engagement in the South Caucasus and, in particular, in the Armenian–Azerbaijani peace process. It argues that decisive importance in this regard was attached to the intensifying competition over artificial intelligence (AI) between the United States and its global rival, China. The article outlines several developments in this sphere and examines their connection to recent U.S. actions in the South Caucasus.
On August 8, 2025, Armenia and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding in Washington on the operation of the TRIPP route passing through Armenian territory. The project constitutes an integral—perhaps even central—element of the Armenian–Azerbaijani peace process. Its primary function is to promote regional stability and establish mutually beneficial economic ties. At the same time, it also serves additional objectives important to the United States. Notably, it contributes to safeguarding the uninterrupted functioning of supply chains linked to U.S. high technologies and the artificial intelligence sector. Artificial intelligence is the key concept here, as it forms one of the core motivations behind Washington’s efforts both to strengthen its regional presence and to facilitate peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Although other strategic considerations also shape U.S. regional policy, this is arguably the most visible one. The global competition surrounding AI provides an additional impetus to American actions in this direction.
A sharp rivalry is currently unfolding for leadership in the field of artificial intelligence. It is primarily between the two leading powers of the modern world: the United States and China. This technological competition has a clear geopolitical dimension. The stakes are high, as the eventual leader could gain decisive economic and military advantages, thereby securing global primacy.
Experts increasingly argue that the continued development of AI may eventually produce a transformative technological breakthrough—so-called “superintelligence.” Such an outcome could trigger an explosive expansion in science and technology, accompanied by a dramatic surge in productivity1. Ultimately, it could lead to what some analysts describe as the “Great Divergence,2” drawing parallels with the radical transformation brought about by the Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth century.
The competition today unfolds along several principal tracks: computing power, AI models, and AI application tools. At present, the United States retains a tangible advantage, particularly in computing capacity. China, however, is rapidly narrowing the gap in the areas of AI models and applications3.
The United States aims to preserve its leading position. To do so, it must not only maintain technological superiority but also eliminate vulnerabilities. One of the most serious vulnerabilities concerns the uninterrupted operation of supply chains. High technology—and especially AI hardware, including semiconductors that underpin computing power—depends critically on certain strategic minerals. Among
these, rare earth elements play a particularly significant role. This group of seventeen metals is widely used not only in civilian industries but also in defense production4.
Ironically, China possesses substantial reserves of rare earth elements. According to some data, it accounts for roughly 60 percent of global extraction. Even more striking is its dominance in processing, with estimates suggesting that China controls up to 90 percent of global refining capacity. This reality represents a serious national security concern for the United States, as it renders critical supply chains highly vulnerable. In the strategic race for technological supremacy, this constitutes a major structural weakness for Washington5.
Under these conditions, alternative sources of supply become vital for the United States. Central Asia represents one such alternative, though not necessarily the most decisive. Owing to its mineral wealth, the region has acquired strategic significance and is gradually becoming an arena of competition between the United States and China6.
In November 2025, a C5+1 summit was held in Washington to strengthen ties with the region. The agreements reached underscored U.S. interest in Central Asia, and the summit has at times been described as an exercise in “critical minerals diplomacy.7”
Even a cursory glance at the map makes it evident that the only reliable route from Central Asia to Western markets—one that meets U.S. standards of security and dependability—currently runs through the South Caucasus. This route bypasses both Iran and Russia. Herein lies the importance of stability in the South Caucasus for the United States, as well as the need for secure and effectively functioning transit corridors. Within this framework, the TRIPP route occupies a central place. Beyond its contribution to the Armenian–Azerbaijani peace process, it is also designed to facilitate the uninterrupted transport of critical minerals from Central Asia.
Conclusion
The launch of the TRIPP route will be of pivotal importance for the final consolidation of peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It will foster regional stability and create preconditions for enhanced trade and economic cooperation among the countries of the region. It is difficult to imagine these processes unfolding in the same manner without direct U.S. involvement.
At the same time, the current U.S. administration’s approach to international affairs is largely transactional. This suggests that, beyond broader geopolitical objectives—whether framed as altruistic aims or as efforts to contain Russia and China—it must also perceive clear and tangible short-term benefits. The renewed interest in Central Asia, driven by strategic competition in artificial intelligence and the imperative to prevent exclusive control of the region by rival powers, served as the catalyst for increased U.S. engagement in the South Caucasus and for its active role in promoting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
1 Jake Sullivan and Tal Feldman, “Geopolitics in the Age of AI, Strategy and Power in an Uncertain AI Future” Foreign Affairs, January 27, 2026․
2 Artificial Intelligence and Great Divergence, The US Council of Economic Advisers, January 2026․
3 Colin H. Kahl, “The Myth of the AI Race: Neither America Nor China Can Achieve True Tech Dominance”, Foreign Affairs, January 12, 2026.
4 Jocelyn Hong, “Access to Critical Minerals is the Achilles’ Heel of Trump’s AI Ambitions”. Tech Policy, Sep. 5, 2025.
5 Ibid.
6 Anton Troianovski, Ana Swanson, Paul Sonne, “In Cozying Up to Trump, Leaders Hedge Their Reliance on Moscow and Beijing”, New York Times, Nov. 7, 2025.
7 Zeynep Gizem Özpinar, “Pipelines and rare elements: Central Asia as new US frontier”, Daily Sabah, Nov 11, 2025.
