For decades, public and political discourse in Armenia has been shaped by the notion that democracy is a weakness, and that certain countries do not require democracy due to the nature of their political systems, strategic constraints, and cultural specificities. It was widely assumed that, in a “no war, no peace” environment, political competition, pluralism, and slower decision-making undermine unity and effectiveness—particularly in times of crisis. Conversely, strong centralized authority was seen as better suited to ensuring stability, security, and rapid action. But is this assumption valid?
The Case for Viewing Democracy as a Vulnerability
The narrative that frames democracy as a vulnerability reflects a combination of Armenia’s post-Soviet security challenges and prevailing political attitudes. In the aftermath of the Nagorno-Karabakh war, amid severe economic hardship, isolation, and the urgent need to consolidate a functioning political system, it was understandable that many viewed strong centralized authority as essential to maintaining stability. In such conditions, slow decision-making and internal divisions were seen as potentially existential risks for a newly independent state.
This perspective was further reinforced by the protracted conflict with Azerbaijan and strained relations with Turkey. Domestic instability—particularly political turnover that could lead to changes in the negotiating team—was also perceived as a potential liability for the negotiation process. Notably, instability itself gradually became associated with democracy, a perception that in part reflects the legacy of Soviet political thinking. Society had been accustomed to centralized authority and restrictions on dissent, which created an illusion of stability. The image of a strong leader, in this context, often became synonymous with that of a strong state.
Another driver of this approach lay in the interests of political elites, for whom democracy and pluralism represented a direct challenge to their hold on power. Maintaining weak opposition forces and limiting media freedom served as convenient tools for preserving authority. Within this framework, arguments were advanced that, for Armenia, stability and security must take absolute priority, with economic development to follow, while democratic reforms, good governance, and the rule of law could be treated as secondary considerations.
Democracy vs Security
The “democracy or security” dilemma was seriously challenged in the aftermath of the 2018 Velvet Revolution, when Armenian society rejected the notion that perceived security could serve as a justification for non-democratic governance. Public perceptions increasingly emphasized the idea that the formation of legitimate authority—grounded in democratic standards, the constitution, and the rule of law—provides greater stability, particularly in times of crisis. Moreover, weak institutions, the absence of accountability, and other systemic shortcomings in
fact undermine security from within. This directly contradicted the assumption that democratization would weaken the state or lead to chaos.
Armenia requires a model in which the development of democracy and the consolidation of institutions serve as guarantees of security and stability—similar to systems found in countries such as the United States, as well as in a number of European and Asian states, where institutional resilience, the viability of the political system, foreign policy, and strategic direction are not dependent solely on the will of an individual or a ruling team. In this regard, transparent governance and leadership accountability can strengthen institutions and improve decision-making, while public trust can enhance societal mobilization.
All of this is particularly critical for a country highly sensitive to security challenges. However, it is precisely in this respect that such an approach was put to the test in 2020, and subsequently in 2021, 2022, and 2023—during the 44-day war, the attacks on Armenia’s sovereign territory, and ultimately the ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh. These developments were often framed as evidence of the failure or shortcomings of democracy, or of Armenia’s democratic trajectory. In reality, however, these events affected the pace of democratic development rather than invalidating it. For instance, the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index has consistently classified Armenia as a “hybrid regime”: while in 2017 Armenia ranked 111th with a score of 4.11, by 2023 it had risen to 84th place with a score of 5.42. A similar pattern is observed in Freedom House’s “Freedom in the World” index, where progress has been steady but gradual.
It should be emphasized that, despite notable improvements in democratic standards and freedom of expression—reflected in recent international reports and indices—it is still premature to speak of a fully consolidated democratic system in Armenia. Public trust in the judiciary remains low, the media landscape is highly polarized and often tied to political and business interests, and reforms in certain sectors continue at a slow pace. In this sense, democracy in Armenia remains fragile and not yet irreversible, particularly in light of intensifying hybrid threats during electoral periods and the potential risks associated with post-election developments.
What Is to Be Done?
It should be noted that strengthening democratic institutions and accelerating reform efforts require peace and stability in the region, along with full unblocking and the uninterrupted functioning of transport routes and economic linkages. In this regard, the outcomes of the August 8, 2025 Washington summit are significant, as is the continuation of the peace process built on its logic. The process, however, is far from smooth: it faces multiple challenges, progresses slowly, and is perceived ambiguously in both Armenia and Azerbaijan.
At the same time, peace and stability are necessary—but not sufficient—conditions for state consolidation and democratic development. Advancing democracy in Armenia also requires
active international support. In this context, Armenia’s primary partner is arguably the European Union. The adoption last year of the law launching the process of Armenia’s accession to the EU was not incidental; it reflects a clear commitment to European integration, which in turn entails the implementation of a wide range of sectoral reforms.
Equally important is the European Union’s role in supporting Armenia’s security. This is not limited to hard security (though efforts in that domain remain essential), but extends to non-traditional dimensions of security, including economic and energy security, cybersecurity, overall resilience, and preparedness to counter hybrid threats, as well as developments in education, social policy, and healthcare. Accordingly, reforms grounded in this cooperation should serve to enhance the country’s overall security. In this sense, just as democracy requires security and development to flourish, security and development themselves depend on democracy. At the same time, it must be emphasized that the relationship between democracy and security is not linear: freedom can foster innovation, economic growth, and long-term stability, but does not in itself guarantee effective governance.
Another important nuance is that, in certain contexts, democracy becomes a geopolitical choice. While democratization is often framed as a domestic process, the geopolitical environment in which a state operates cannot be ignored. Today, Armenia aspires to become a democratic outpost in the region, yet sustaining such a position is particularly challenging given its neighborhood—especially considering the political systems of major regional actors such as Russia, Iran, and Turkey. Moreover, Armenia’s democratization is unfolding amid intense geopolitical competition and even ongoing military conflicts in its vicinity, factors that inevitably shape domestic dynamics.
Conclusion
The perceived trade-off between democracy and security in Armenia has been shaped by historical, security-related, and political factors. However, recent experience demonstrates that democracy cannot be regarded as an inherent vulnerability. At the same time, it does not automatically guarantee security: this requires strong institutions, strategic thinking, and sustained reform. For Armenia, the key challenge lies in strengthening state capacity so that democracy becomes not a source of fragility, but a genuine foundation for sustainable development and security.
Varduhi Harutyunyan [1]https://www.caucasuswatch-de1.caucasuswatch.org/en/insights/democratic-governance-and-institutional-reforms.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com [2]https://europeancorrespondent.com/en/r/how-armenia-is-becoming-the-regions-only-democracy-sort-of
[3] https://europeandemocracyhub.epd.eu/armenias-fragile-democratisation-a-new-role-for-the-eu/ [4] https://rcds.am/en/armenias-aspirations-for-freedom-democracy-and-security.html [5] https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/democracy-index-by-country [6] https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2025/ [7] https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world
