Introduction
In one of my previous works, I have addressed the upcoming parliamentary elections and put forward several forecasts regarding voter turnout, the participating forces, and the election results. I’ve also noted that the series of forecasts will consist of three parts. In this second part, two months prior to the elections, I will attempt to assess the previous forecasts by revising or reaffirming them, as well as supplementing them with new projections.
It is noteworthy that, following the previous work, the results of two public opinion polls were released, which I have also examined in detail. Recently, the second set of results from EVN Report’s public opinion polling series was published, which, together with the data from the previous surveys, will be used to formulate and assess the forecasts.
Forecasts
Voter turnout, in percentage terms, will be higher than in the previous two parliamentary elections
This forecast, made previously, should be reaffirmed based on the available data. The polling data indicate that around 70% of respondents intend to participate in the elections.
Moreover, in the previous work, I noted that the voter registry would decline as a result of legislative changes. We can already verify this from the published figures. According to the data presented by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in February, the number of registered voters in Armenia stands at 2,489,031. In comparison with the data presented in the table below, the decline in the number of voters is clearly evident.
| The Election | Number of Participants | Number of Voters | Voter Turnout (%) |
| 2018 | 1,261,105 | 2,593,140 | 48.6 |
| 2021 | 1,281,997 | 2,595,512 | 49.3 |
| 2026* | – | 2,489,031 | – |
As of February 2026
Thus, by combining the approximate reduction of around 100,000 in the absolute number of voters with the high proportion of respondents expressing readiness to participate in the elections, it can be reaffirmed that the voter turnout percentage will be higher than in the previous parliamentary elections.
Fewer alliances will be observed among the participating forces
In the previous forecast, I noted that the relatively high threshold for alliances would result in a smaller proportion of alliances among electoral participants.
This assertion should be reaffirmed, given that the high electoral threshold and existing legislative shortcomings allow political forces to run as individual parties. However, an assessment of the preliminary situation indicates that several alliances have already been announced (e.g., Armenia Alliance, Strong Armenia Alliance and others). Notably, according to the current polling landscape, only one alliance—“Strong Armenia”—surpasses the electoral threshold.
“Prosperous Armenia,” led by Gagik Tsarukyan, will enter parliament
Following the preceding arguments, it is logical to address this forecast. I previously stated that the force led by Gagik Tsarukyan would attempt to position itself as a third political force. This is facilitated by its relatively neutral stance on a number of political issues. The effectiveness of this positioning will determine whether it secures representation in parliament.
An analysis of the IRI polling data indicates that Tsarukyan has, to some extent, succeeded in positioning himself as a third force. Among his potential electorate, there is an even distribution between those who view Russia as Armenia’s key partner and those who prioritize the collective West. Similarly, his supporters are evenly split between those who believe Armenia is moving in the right direction and those who hold the opposite view.
An analysis of the data, including the latest publication by EVN Report, shows that 3.3% of respondents are inclined to vote for Tsarukyan’s political force. Taking into account the margin of error, this may be sufficient to surpass the electoral threshold for parties. It is likely, based on these polling indicators, that the force registered as a party rather than as an alliance.
More political forces will enter parliament
Currently available polling data make the above forecast less likely. According to these data, the Civil Contract party holds a 33.6% approval rating, while “Strong Armenia” has 11.4%. The remaining political forces do not surpass the electoral threshold. The number of undecided respondents and those who refused to answer is significant (in total, around 37%). It should be assumed that, if this 37% is distributed proportionally among those expressing a high willingness to participate in the elections, several political forces would nevertheless be able to overcome the electoral threshold, and more than three forces would be represented in parliament. In addition to the aforementioned three, these would include the Civil Contract party, “Strong Armenia,” and the Prosperous Armenia Party.
Otherwise, it should be noted that the Constitution guarantees the presence of at least three political forces in parliament. However, unlike in 2021, when a similar situation occurred and the “I Have Honor” alliance entered parliament, the current regulations have been amended. Thus, according to the Electoral Code, if fewer than three political forces overcome the electoral threshold, it is not the three parties with the highest vote totals that enter parliament, but rather those that are closest to surpassing their respective thresholds.
There will be no second round of elections
This forecast is also reaffirmed based on the latest polling data. Moreover, according to EVN Report, the Civil Contract party currently stands at 41.5–50.3%. If this projection proves accurate, then, as a result of the distribution of parliamentary mandates, the Civil Contract party will secure a majority of seats and form the government independently. Considering the patterns observed in polling trends and the absence of significant external influencing factors, this forecast is likely to materialize. These data have also brought forward a hypothesis in public discourse, which will be addressed below.
No political force will hold a constitutional majority
By “constitutional majority,” we refer to two-thirds of parliamentary seats, which are required for the adoption of a number of key decisions, laws, and codes. In certain discussions, the relatively increasing approval rating of the Civil Contract party has led to assumptions that, through the redistribution of mandates from forces failing to surpass the threshold, the party could obtain two-thirds of parliamentary seats. This scenario is unlikely, given the provision in the Electoral Code stipulating that if a single force does not receive two-thirds of the vote but could obtain two-thirds of the mandates, forces that have surpassed the 2% threshold are also included in the mandate allocation process. This regulation also serves as an additional argument supporting the forecast that more than three political forces will be represented in parliament.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it should be reiterated that the purpose of these forecasts is not to claim ultimate truth or provide a definitive account of reality. At this stage, uncertainties still outweigh concrete data; however, in the final part of this series, it will be possible to outline the outlook for future developments with greater clarity.
Tigran Mughnetsyan
