Hybrid threats involve the simultaneous use of a variety of instruments—informational, economic, cyber, political, and sometimes even coercive tools. While the previous article examined disinformation and propaganda campaigns targeting Armenia, this section focuses primarily on other key components of hybrid influence, namely cyberattacks and economic pressure. It will also address Kremlin meta-narratives.
Cyberattacks as a Tool of Hybrid Threats
Cyberattacks have become an almost inseparable element of hybrid threats. Armenia has repeatedly been subjected to such attacks and continues to face them today. Available data suggest that a significant portion of these attacks originate from Russian networks or from groups associated with Russia.
According to the 2025 report “Armenia: The Landscape of Digital Threats,” published by the CyberHUB-AM Institute for Multilateral Information, cyberattacks have targeted not only individual media outlets and civil society organizations but also state institutions.
The report identifies several key cyber threats facing Armenia, including mercenary spyware, phishing attacks, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, website defacement, Remote Access Trojans (RATs), and insider threats. The report also highlights cyber groups linked to specific Russian state structures that have targeted Armenia’s governmental system. In particular, it notes that various groups operating under the patronage of Russian state institutions—including APT28 (Fancy Bear), associated with Russia’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), and the Turla group, linked to the Federal Security Service (FSB)—have demonstrated activity by employing targeted phishing campaigns and other tactics against Armenian government institutions.These findings indicate that cyberspace has become a domain in which interference in Armenia’s internal affairs and influence operations are increasingly carried out.
A number of other cyberattacks targeting Armenia further illustrate the systemic nature of this threat. According to CyberHUB-AM, in January 2024 the hacker group Anonymous Russia carried out DDoS attacks against Armenian government websites, banks, and telecommunications companies. In June of the same year, the group People’s Cyber Army of Russia launched DDoS attacks against Armenian government websites.
The People’s Cyber Army of Russia is a well-known group in the international cyber domain and is recognized for its large-scale cyber operations. It has been linked to several high-profile cyberattacks, one of the most notable being an attack on Ukraine’s nuclear agency.
It should also be noted that the People’s Cyber Army of Russia claimed responsibility for a number of cyberattacks carried out against the websites of Armenia’s government and law enforcement bodies. In other words, in this case the attacks were conducted quite openly. The hacker group justified its actions with a statement that closely echoed several Kremlin propaganda narratives, as well as positions expressed by certain pro-Russian circles in Armenia.
It is also noteworthy that the Russian hackers expressed support for the opposition movement in Armenia led at the time by Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, claiming that they had received such a request from the Armenian community in Krasnodar.
Economic Pressure as a Tool of Hybrid Threats
Economic pressure is another important component of the hybrid tools used against Armenia.
For example, the Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance (Rosselkhoznadzor) regularly announces that certain products exported from Armenia do not meet established standards. As a rule, such statements often coincide with specific propaganda or disinformation campaigns targeting Armenia.
Within Armenian expert circles and in the media, it is also frequently discussed that disruptions in the operation of the Lars checkpoint may sometimes have not only technical or weather-related causes, but also political undertones. The energy sector also contains significant levers of influence. Natural gas supplied from Russia to Armenia is often viewed as an important instrument of political leverage.
At the same time, narratives resembling economic blackmail are actively circulated within Russian official discourse. According to these narratives, Armenia’s economic growth is largely dependent on economic cooperation with Russia, and there are no viable alternatives to such cooperation.
For example, one such statement reads:
“The largest Armenian diaspora is in the Russian Federation, large sums of money are transferred from Russia, and trade is primarily conducted with our country. All of this does not exactly correspond with integration into the European Union.”
Lavrov’s Statements as an Example of Implicit Economic Pressure
Statements made in 2024 by Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov can be viewed as one of the clearest examples of implicit economic pressure. Lavrov noted in particular:
“Gazprom Armenia supplies natural gas at a price of 177 dollars per thousand cubic meters. In the West they pay two to three times more. If they want to heat Armenia with their gas, I do not know how that will work. If they, as the Americans want, close the nuclear power plant and replace it with their small modular reactors…
The South Caucasus Railway has set preferential tariffs for passenger transport and infrastructure investments over the years. The Zangezur Copper-Molybdenum Combine is one of the main contributors to the state budget. Therefore, those who are trying to create an ‘image’ of the Russian Federation and the Eurasian Economic Union exploiting ‘small Armenia’ should think about this.”
Kremlin Meta-Narratives about Armenia
In general, it should be noted that hybrid threats originating from Russian circles—implemented primarily through large-scale disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, destabilizing actions carried out through local proxy actors, and economic pressure—are built around several overarching narratives.
There are, so to speak, meta-narratives within which more situational micro-narratives are constructed. The central meta-narrative claims that the current Armenian authorities are instruments of the West, brought to power in order to push Russia out of the region and turn Armenia into a geopolitical platform for globalist interests.
According to this narrative, the authorities—supposedly with Western backing—are undermining Armenian identity, eroding traditional values, and morally corrupting Armenian society. It should be noted that while official Moscow typically promotes its narratives in a cautious or indirect manner, its main propagandists do not hesitate to directly target the Armenian authorities using a wide range of propaganda techniques. This was discussed in the first and second parts of this article. Here, I will provide another example.
In October 2023, Russia’s Channel One aired a lengthy program directed personally against Nikol Pashinyan, filled with distortions, extreme insults, and manipulative claims. The following excerpts from the accompanying text essentially reflect a significant portion of the key Kremlin propaganda narratives about Armenia: ։
“Nikol Pashinyan repeatedly rejected the peace proposals on Nagorno-Karabakh offered by the Russian side, saying ‘we will fight,’ but in the end surrendered the territory without a battle…”,
“he is moving toward the West,”
“he helped the United States ignite conflicts in an already unstable region,”
“either he is trying to ‘sit on two chairs,’ or he wants to move from former allies—whom he has already placed among unfriendly neighbors—to new patrons, this time officially…”
Conclusion
It should be emphasized that the existence of hybrid threats does not necessarily mean that the state employing such tools refuses to maintain relations with the targeted country. Nor does it mean that Armenia cannot maintain relations with states from which such pressures originate.
However, the use of such instruments serves as a reminder that in international relations—particularly when dealing with large authoritarian states—various mechanisms of influence and pressure are frequently employed. These hybrid tools are often used when a state seeks to exert influence while avoiding open military confrontation.Therefore, for Armenia, strengthening the resilience of state institutions, the information environment, and cybersecurity systems remains a priority. Equally important is the deepening of policies aimed at diversifying the country’s external economic and political partnerships.
Edgar Vardanyan
