Part I
In June 2025, during a press conference in Yerevan following a meeting with Armenia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Ararat Mirzoyan, the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaiya Kallas, stated that “Armenia and the European Union have never been closer than they are now.” She also emphasized that the democratic values shared by the EU and Armenia must be defended, “especially in the context of hybrid threats, disinformation, and interference in domestic affairs.” Kallas added that the EU would stand by Armenia and support it in safeguarding these values.
On December 2, Kallas issued a new statement, noting:
“Russia and its proxies are conducting disinformation campaigns in Armenia ahead of the parliamentary elections. We are seeing the same networks that were used in Moldova working very actively. In other words, the scenario is the same. EU funding will help identify and respond to foreign influence.”
On December 15, she reaffirmed her previous statements, highlighting that Armenia itself requested assistance to counter hybrid threats:
“Elections are upcoming in Armenia. What can we do to help them? They have requested assistance to counter malicious influence similar to the support we provided to Moldova.”
These statements prompted a response from Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who stated:
“Kaiya Kallas has publicly promised that the European Union will help Armenia counter harmful foreign interference, just as they did in Moldova. This is a frank confession, an admission of guilt.”
Thus, the Russian Foreign Minister effectively asserts that the EU is interfering in Armenia’s internal affairs. In reality, however, the EU is merely providing assistance at Armenia’s request. This illustrates that Russia does not respect Armenia’s sovereign right to seek help from any actor. Ultimately, what business does one sovereign state have with the external assistance sources and formats of another sovereign state? Lavrov’s statement itself can be interpreted as an indirect admission that Russia is interfering in Armenia’s internal affairs.
Today, when discussing interference in the domestic affairs of states, such actions are increasingly characterized as “hybrid threats” or “hybrid warfare.”
Various influential international organizations have proposed definitions for hybrid warfare and threats. For instance, NATO notes:
“NATO allies face threats and challenges posed by both state and non-state actors that target political institutions, influence public opinion, and undermine the security of NATO citizens through hybrid actions. Hybrid methods of warfare, such as propaganda, deception, sabotage, and other non-military means, have long been used to destabilize adversaries. Recent attacks are notable for their speed, scale, and intensity, driven by rapid technological change and global interconnectedness.[1]”
Thus, NATO views hybrid attacks as hybrid methods of warfare—that is, non-military forms of war.
Within EU policy circles, however, the term most commonly used is “hybrid threats.” The EU defines hybrid threats as follows:
“Hybrid threats refer to situations where state or non-state actors seek to exploit vulnerabilities in the European Union for their own interests by systematically employing a combination of tools (diplomatic, military, economic, technological, etc.) while remaining below the threshold of formally declared war. Examples include disrupting democratic decision-making processes through large-scale disinformation campaigns, using social media to control political narratives, or directing the radicalization, recruitment, and deployment of proxies.[2]”
In essence, the EU and NATO approaches describe the same phenomenon but with different emphases. NATO treats hybrid actions as forms of warfare, whereas the EU clearly notes that they remain below the threshold of declared war and therefore do not constitute war per se.
It is also worth noting that the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE), established with NATO and EU support in Helsinki, offers the following comprehensive definition, reflecting the center’s professional and institutional authority:
“Hybrid threats are harmful actions that are deliberately planned and executed with malicious intent. They aim to disrupt a target (e.g., a state or institution) through various, often combined, means. These may include informational manipulation, cyberattacks, economic coercion, clandestine political maneuvers, coercive diplomacy, or threats of military force. The term ‘hybrid threats’ encompasses a wide range of harmful activities, from influence operations and interference to hybrid warfare.[3]”
Based on this definition, several important conclusions can be drawn:
1. The mere dissemination of disinformation does not constitute a hybrid threat if it is not malicious and does not aim to disrupt a state or institution. This counters the notion that anyone spreading disinformation is automatically participating in a hybrid attack. At the same time, many individuals may unknowingly become indirect participants in such threats by sharing content generated within hybrid campaigns.
2. Hybrid threats generally result from the combined use of multiple tools. However, in certain cases, a single tool may still be considered a hybrid threat.
3. Hybrid warfare is not synonymous with hybrid threats but represents one potential form. In other words, the use of force can fall under hybrid threats, but not all hybrid threats involve military components. Notably, a 2016 EU document specifies that military methods can be considered hybrid threats if they remain below the threshold of formally declared war. Accordingly, conventional, large-scale warfare does not qualify as a hybrid threat.
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To be continued
Author: Edgar Vardanyan
Associate Expert, Armenian Council
[1] “Translation by the author.”
[2]“Translation by the author.”
[3] “Translation by the author.”
